Summary: Mr X complained about the Council’s delay in complying with its agreement to further review his homelessness application. We found fault by the Council which caused Mr X avoidable distress. The Council had since completed its further review and apologised to Mr X for its delay. The Council also agreed to make a symbolic payment to Mr X to suitably and proportionately address the injustice caused by its fault.

The complaint

1. Mr X said, following legal action, the Council agreed to review its decision on his homelessness application. But, when the Council changed his case officer seven months later, it appeared no action had yet been taken to review the decision. Mr X said the Council’s delay was frustrating and caused great distress. To put matters right, Mr X wanted the Council to review its decision, apologise, and compensate him for distress caused by its delay.

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The Ombudsman’s role and powers

2. We investigate complaints about ‘maladministration’ and ‘service failure’. In this statement, I have used the word fault to refer to these. We must also consider whether any fault has had an adverse impact on the person making the complaint. I refer to this as ‘injustice’. If there has been fault which has caused significant injustice, or that could cause injustice to others in the future we may suggest a remedy. (Local Government Act 1974, sections 26(1) and 26A(1), as
3. We cannot investigate a complaint about the start of court action or what happened in court. (Local Government Act 1974, Schedule 5, paragraph 1, as amended)
4. The law says we cannot normally investigate a complaint when someone could take the matter to court. However, we may decide to investigate if we consider it would be unreasonable to expect the person to go to court. (Local Government Act 1974, section 26(6)(c), as amended)
5. When considering complaints we make findings based on the balance of probabilities. This means that we look at the available relevant evidence and decide what was more likely to have happened.
6. If we are satisfied with a council’s actions or proposed actions, we can complete our investigation and issue a decision statement. (Local Government Act 1974, section 30(1B) and 34H(1), as amended)

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What I have and have not investigated

7. Mr X made an earlier complaint to us about the Council’s handling of his homelessness application. When we decided that complaint, finding fault causing injustice, Mr X’s application was before the courts. The court proceedings ended with the issue of a consent order as Mr X and the Council agreed on the way forward. I did not reinvestigate events before the court action as we had considered these matters as part of our earlier investigation. And I could not consider the court proceedings (see paragraph 3 of this statement).
8. Mr X had a right to return to the court when the Council exceeded the timescale (eight weeks) for reviewing its decision on his application following the consent order. However, given the background to Mr X’s current complaint, I exercised my discretion to investigate what happened following the consent order (see paragraph 4).

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How I considered this complaint

9. I considered evidence provided by Mr X and the Council. I also considered relevant law, policy and guidance. This included the Housing Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) and the Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities (the Code). Mr X and the Council had an opportunity to comment on my draft decision. I considered any comments received before making a final decision.

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What I found

Background

10. Part 7 of the 1996 Act and the Code set out council powers and duties to people who are homeless or threatened with homelessness. Someone is homeless if they have no accommodation or if they have accommodation, but it is not reasonable for them to continue to live there. (See: section 175 of the 1996 Act)
11. If a council is satisfied someone is unintentionally homeless, eligible for assistance, and has a priority need, it has a duty to secure that accommodation is available for their occupation. This is known as ‘the main housing duty’. Examples of applicants in priority need are:

• people with dependent children;
• pregnant women;
• people who are vulnerable due to serious health problems, disability, or old age;
• care leavers; and
• victims of domestic abuse.

(See: sections 189 and 193 of the 1996 Act, the Homelessness Act 2002, the Homelessness (Priority need for Accommodation (England) Order 2002, and paragraph 15.39 of the Code)

12. After completing inquiries, the council must give the applicant a decision in writing. If it is an adverse decision, the letter must fully explain the reasons. All letters must include information about the right to request a review and the timescale for doing so. (See: section 184 of the 1996 Act and paragraph 18.30 of the Code)
13. The council has eight weeks to complete a review about an applicant’s eligibility for assistance or that they are not in priority need. The time can be extended if the applicant agrees in writing. The review must be carried out by someone who was not involved in the original decision and who is more senior to the original decision maker. (See: The Homelessness (Review Procedure etc.) Regulations 2018 and chapter 19 of the Code)
14. The council must advise applicants of their right to appeal to the county court on a point of law, and of the period in which to appeal. Applicants can also appeal if the council takes more than the prescribed time to complete the review. (See: sections 202 to 204 of the 1996 Act)
15. Applicants may ask the council to provide accommodation while it carries out the review. Councils have a power, but not a duty, to accommodate certain applicants and members of their household. (See: sections 188(3), 199A(6), and 200(5) of the 1996 Act)

What happened

16. The Council provided Mr X with housing while it considered his homelessness application. It later decided Mr X was unintentionally homeless, eligible for assistance but not in priority need. By November 2024, following an appeal to the county court, the Council had agreed to further review its decision that Mr X was not in priority need.
17. In December 2024 and February and March 2025, the Council wrote to Mr X asking for more time to complete the review. Each time Mr X, concerned about further delay, contacted his lawyers. Mr X’s lawyers advised that he cooperate with the Council as it was likely trying to gather information about his case. Mr X, taking the advice, wrote to the Council agreeing each of the time extensions.
18. The third extension deadline passed in late April 2025. About two months later, a Council officer emailed Mr X saying they were now dealing with the review and asking him for information. Mr X said he had long ago given that information to the Council. Mr X read the Council’s email as meaning it had not started the review during the preceding seven months. Mr X contacted his lawyers, who again advised he cooperate. Mr X said he immediately resent the information to the Council.
19. Mr X also complained to the Council saying it had clearly not progressed the review during the last seven months. And, as the eight-week review timescale was now long past, Mr X asked the Council to urgently complete the review and compensate him for his wasted time.
20. Over the following seven weeks Mr X’s complaint went through the Council’s complaints procedure. The Council told Mr X that, while starting the review in autumn 2024, significant demands on its service meant the review was not completed within eight weeks. It had therefore asked Mr X for time extensions. It then had to reallocate his case because of the original case officer’s absence. The new case officer had written to Mr X being unable to contact his lawyers but had not asked him for information he had already provided. Rather, after seven months, the new officer considered his circumstances might have changed and so need updating. However, the Council accepted it had not met the eight-week time target and Mr X had received a poor service. The Council partially upheld the complaint and apologised but refused to compensate Mr X.
21. Mr X, dissatisfied with the Council’s response, brought his complaint to us. He recognised his circumstances might have changed after seven months. However, he questioned why the Council had not asked him for an update sooner if it had been making reasonable enquiries about his case during those seven months. Mr X also said an apology was insufficient given his earlier upheld complaint and his court action ending so the Council could urgently review his case.
22. Meanwhile, in late June 2025, the Council wrote to Mr X. The Council said it was minded to uphold its decision that he was not in priority need but invited his comments before completing the review. Mr X’s lawyers responded a few days later and asked for a copy of Mr X’s application file and all relevant papers so they could respond to the letter. The Council said it needed time to provide the copy file and papers and then Mr X’s lawyers needed time to comment. It therefore agreed a mid-August 2025 date for Mr X’s lawyers to reply to its ‘minded to’ letter.
23. After we received Mr X’s complaint, the Council completed its review. It overturned its earlier decision and found Mr X was in priority need. The Council made its decision about a year after it said it had started to review Mr X’s case following the court proceedings. Mr X remains in his temporary home until he can move to a permanent home.

Consideration

24. The Council settled Mr X’s court action by agreeing to further review his application and its decision that he did not have a priority need for housing. It took the Council over a year to deliver on that agreement although the legal timescale for a review was eight weeks. However, in considering the time taken to complete the review, I had to take into account the parties correspondence about time extensions. The evidence showed the Council asked for and Mr X agreed to three time extensions, with the first extension sought after about eight weeks. I recognised that while wanting a speedy decision, Mr X said he felt obliged to agree the time extensions to avoid appearing uncooperative. However, Mr X had a choice and could have refused all or any of the time extensions. And Mr X had access to legal advice, which he said he took before agreeing each of the time extensions. So, although over five months had passed when the third agreed time extension expired, I could not find there was fault by the Council here.
25. However, the Council did not ask for another time extension around late April 2025. Rather, it was mid-June when the Council next contacted Mr X. I found fault here as the Council failed to seek a further time extension or contact Mr X for about seven weeks.
26. I recognised Mr X’s concern about the Council’s June 2025 contact suggesting it had not yet started to review his case. However, regardless of what the Council did in the preceding seven months, about two weeks later, it issued a ‘minded to’ decision letter about Mr X’s homelessness application. I therefore found that once it reallocated Mr X’s case to another officer in June 2025, the Council quickly reached a provisional review decision. And there was no evidence of avoidable delay or other fault by the Council during June 2025.
27. After its ‘minded to’ letter, it took a further three and a half months before the Council issued its formal decision. However, the evidence showed Mr X’s legal advisers had until August 2025 to respond to the Council’s ‘minded to’ decision. I saw no evidence to show when Mr X’s lawyer’s did respond. The evidence showed it took the Council more than two months after August to issue its decision letter. On balance, I found there was further avoidable delay by the Council given its decision came about a year after it said it started to review Mr X’s case.
28. In taking about a year to complete the further review, the Council had apologised to Mr X for any inconvenience caused by its delay. The evidence showed the Council issued its further review decision letter nearly four years after Mr X first contacted it as homeless. During those four years, we had upheld an earlier complaint by Mr X about the Council’s handling of his application. Mr X had also used his right to appeal to the courts, which had led to the Council’s agreement to carry out the further review. In the circumstances here, the Council’s apology did not suitably address the distress to Mr X arising from its overall avoidable delay in further reviewing his application. I therefore found there remained unremedied significant personal injustice to Mr X.

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Action

29. Having found fault causing injustice, I considered our guidance on remedies. The Council had issued its further review decision letter and apologised to Mr X. However, a symbolic payment was also needed to proportionately, appropriately and reasonably put matters right. The Council therefore agreed, within 30 working days of this decision statement, to:

• pay Mr X £200 in recognition of the distress caused by its avoidable delay and poor handling of the agreed review of his homelessness application.

30. The Council also agreed to provide us with evidence it complied with the action set out in paragraph 29.

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Decision

31. I found fault causing injustice. The Council agreed actions to remedy injustice.

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Investigator's decision on behalf of the Ombudsman