Summary: There was fault by the Council in its handling of this homelessness case. It did not review whether the complainant was in priority need when it should, and required him to provide evidence he was homeless beyond what was legally required, and despite the fact it had already accepted he was homeless. This meant the complainant remained homeless for a period when the Council should have accommodated him. The Council has agreed to offer the complainant a financial remedy, and issue guidance to staff to ensure they correctly understand the law. The Council was also at fault because it gave the complainant inaccurate information about its deposit scheme, but this did not cause an injustice.

The complaint

1. I will refer to the complainant as Mr J.
2. Mr J complains the Council:

• did not provide him with interim accommodation while it considered his homelessness application, which left him street homeless and living in his car;
• delayed paying the initial costs for a private rented property he had identified, delaying his move into the property; and
• discriminated against him as a disabled person.

Back to top

The Ombudsman’s role and powers

3. We investigate complaints about ‘maladministration’ and ‘service failure’. In this statement, I have used the word fault to refer to these. We must also consider whether any fault has had an adverse impact on the person making the complaint. I refer to this as ‘injustice’. If there has been fault which has caused significant injustice, or that could cause injustice to others in the future we may suggest a remedy. (Local Government Act 1974, sections 26(1) and 26A(1), as amended)

Back to top

What I have and have not investigated

4. I have investigated the first two points of Mr J’s complaint, about interim accommodation and the payment of initial costs.
5. I have not investigated Mr J’s complaint the Council discriminated against him as a disabled person. This is because discrimination is a legal matter which can only be decided by the relevant courts.

Back to top

How I considered this complaint

6. I considered evidence provided by Mr J and the Council as well as relevant law, policy and guidance.
7. I also shared a draft copy of this decision with each party for their comments.

Back to top

What I found

Legal background

8. If someone contacts a council seeking accommodation or help to obtain accommodation and gives ‘reason to believe’ they ‘may be’ homeless or threatened with homelessness within 56 days, the council has a duty to make inquiries into what, if any, further duty it owes them. The threshold for triggering the duty to make inquiries is low. The person does not have to complete a specific form or approach a particular department of the council. (Housing Act 1996, section 184 and Homelessness Code of Guidance paragraphs 6.2 and 18.5)
9. A council must secure accommodation for applicants and their household if it has reason to believe they may be homeless, eligible for assistance and have a priority need. This is called interim accommodation. (Housing Act 1996, section 188)
10. If a council is satisfied an applicant is unintentionally homeless, eligible for assistance, and has a priority need the council has a duty to secure that accommodation is available for their occupation. This is called the main housing duty. The accommodation a council provides until it can end this duty is called temporary accommodation. (Housing Act 1996, section 193)

Mr J’s complaint

11. The following is a summary of the key events relevant to this complaint. It is not intended to provide a detailed chronology of everything that happened.
12. Mr J has several physical disabilities. In May 2024 the Council received a referral indicating he was likely to become homeless soon. The Council opened a homelessness case for him and began to make enquiries.
13. On 3 June the Council accepted a homelessness prevention duty for Mr J and created a personalised housing plan (PHP) for him. Part of the plan was for Mr J to seek accommodation in the private rented sector. On the same date, the Council received medical advice which said Mr J’s disabilities did not make him particularly vulnerable, and did not recommend he be housed on medical grounds.
14. On 14 June, after Mr J was asked to leave his accommodation and became homeless, the Council ended its prevention duty and accepted a relief duty for him, writing to him to confirm this. Mr J went to stay with friends and family for the time being.
15. On 17 June the Council received updated medical advice, which now recommended Mr J should be housed on medical grounds.
16. Mr J then notified the Council he had applied for a private rented property. On 5 July he applied to the Council for a grant to cover the deposit and initial rent for the property.
17. Through July the Council continued to make enquiries to establish Mr J’s circumstances. On 30 July, Mr J’s case officer sought authorisation to provide Mr J with interim accommodation.
18. On 1 August Mr J signed the tenancy agreement for the private rented property. On the same date, Mr J said he began living in his car, because he was no longer able to stay with friends and family.
19. On 2 August, having received a copy of the tenancy agreement for the purpose of Mr J’s deposit scheme application, the Council identified an error in it. It quickly rectified this and included the correct agreement in Mr J’s application.
20. The tenancy agreement commenced on 5 August. However, the landlord had told Mr J they would not agree a move-in date until his deposit was paid, and so he continued living in his car.
21. On 7 August, Mr J’s case officer sought authorisation for his deposit scheme application. On the same day, Mr J provided evidence he was living in his car, and asked the Council for emergency accommodation. In response, the case officer advised Mr J he should visit a street homeless team, to prove he was homeless.
22. Later on 7 August Mr J submitted a formal stage 1 complaint to the Council. He said:

• his PHP said the Council would provide assistance to him in finding suitable accommodation, and to cover moving-in costs, but it had not done either;
• he found it difficult to contact his case officer, and when the officer did reply, his responses were vague and unhelpful;
• the case officer had failed to accept he was homeless despite the evidence he had provided;
• he was unable to visit the street homeless team, in part because of one of his disabilities;
• he was concerned he would lose the property because of the Council’s delay in paying his costs; and
• he felt the case officer was discriminating against him due to his disabilities.

23. On 23 August the Council rejected Mr J’s deposit scheme application. This was because it exceeded the maximum payment allowed under the Council’s policy. On 27 August the case officer contacted Mr J’s landlord to ask them to accept a lower payment as an incentive, which they agreed.
24. The Council approved the incentive payment on 2 September and paid it to the landlord on 6 September.
25. The Council responded to Mr J’s stage 1 complaint on 5 September. It said:

• it did not agree the case officer had maintained an inadequate standard of communication with Mr J. The Council highlighted the case officer had other duties than just Mr J’s case, and had explained more than once he could not always respond as quickly as Mr J would like;
• Mr J had provided no evidence to show the case officer had discriminated against him;
• Mr J’s PHP said he should search for private rented properties himself, which he had done. As he was now suitably housed there was limited further involvement for the Council’s homelessness service;
• the case officer had actively pursued Mr J’s deposit scheme application but was not responsible for deciding the application. The Council acknowledged there had been a delay in processing the application and apologised for this, but explained it was important the Council follow the correct procedure before paying out public funds;
• it was also important for the Council to verify Mr J’s homelessness before agreeing to provide accommodation, and he had not complied with the Council’s requests to provide evidence; and
• Mr J’s landlord had not complained about the delay in payment.

26. The Council therefore did not uphold Mr J’s complaint.
27. On 12 September, the Council wrote to Mr J to confirm it had ended its relief duty.
28. Mr J made a stage 2 complaint on 2 October. He said:

• the Council had not helped him secure the private rented accommodation, and he had been at risk of losing it because of the delay in payment. The Council should not say its involvement was limited until a tenancy was officially agreed;
• he had been actively homeless during this period but was left in a vulnerable position;
• the Council’s response had not addressed the fact he had lived in his car for several weeks, and not offered him emergency accommodation despite being in priority need because of disabilities;
• the Council had initially informed him it had approved the original payment under the deposit scheme, before telling him it could only pay the lower amount, causing distress and confusion; and
• the case officer’s infrequent communication meant the Council had not complied with his reasonable adjustments, and he had said he would submit further evidence of alleged discrimination upon request.

29. The Council responded on 6 November. It first highlighted an abusive message Mr J had sent to the case officer on 12 September, and warned him this was unacceptable. Then, turning to his points of complaint, it said:

• the fact Mr J had secured a property on his own did not mean the Council had done nothing;
• the delay and confusion around the deposit payment had come about because of a recent change in regulations and the Council’s procedures. The Council advised the process could take up to 28 days. Although Mr J’s application had taken longer than it wished, the Council said it had complied with its service standards. Officers had not lied to Mr J;
• it should have reassessed Mr J’s priority need and considered again his need for interim accommodation. The Council upheld this point of Mr J’s complaint;
• it was correct for the stage 1 response to say there was now limited involvement for the Council in Mr J’s case, because his property had been secured by the date of sending and the payment was about to be made. The Council assured Mr J it would have continued to work with him if his tenancy had fallen through for some reason;
• Mr J’s case officer had responded to his correspondence appropriately and within its customer service timescales. Mr J had not provided evidence to show delays or a failure to respond to his correspondence;
• Mr J had still not provided evidence of discrimination against him.

30. Mr J referred his complaint to the Ombudsman on 7 December.

Back to top

Analysis

31. I will address each of the two points I have investigated separately.

Council’s decision not to provide interim accommodation

32. The law says councils must provide interim accommodation to a person or household, where they have reason to believe they are homeless, eligible for assistance and in priority need. Being in ‘priority need’ means the person is vulnerable, which may include having significant disabilities.
33. I asked the Council to elaborate on the comments it made in response to Mr J’s complaint, that it should have reassessed his priority need. The Council said:

“The Stage 2 complaint response acknowledges that a reassessment of [Mr J’s] circumstances would have been appropriate when he requested homeless accommodation in August 2024. It would have been appropriate to complete an assessment to update [Mr J’s] homeless application, in relation to his correspondence at the beginning of August 2024.

“The process the Council should have completed at the beginning of August, would have considered [Mr J’s] likely priority need, eligibility and homelessness, triggering ‘reason to believe’. This then resulting in the likely provision of interim accommodation the first week of August 2024.”

34. It is positive the Council has recognised this, and acknowledged it should have provided Mr J with interim accommodation. But I do not share the Council’s view the need for this reassessment only came about in August, at the point Mr J became street homeless (which living in a car is considered to be).
35. I note the Council received advice from an independent medical assessor on 3 June, that Mr J did not need to be housed on medical grounds. Two weeks later, on 17 June, the assessor reversed this advice, and now recommended (albeit cautiously) that Mr J should be housed due to his disabilities.
36. The law does not require the Council to accept or act upon third party advice of this nature, and so it could legitimately have made a decision not to follow it. However, the Council should at least be able to show how it considered the advice, and why it decided not to follow it, if so. There is nothing in the evidence I have seen to show the Council did anything at all with this updated advice though.
37. Although Mr J was not yet street homeless, he was still legally homeless. This being so, the Council should have reassessed its decision about Mr J’s priority need at this point, after receiving the updated medical advice. Had it done so, and given its comments to me, I consider on balance the Council would likely have found Mr J in priority need, and placed him in interim accommodation, sometime around the end of June.
38. On a separate point, I am also concerned the case officer told Mr J he needed to present to the street homelessness team, to ‘prove’ he was homeless.
39. The legal standard for accepting a duty to provide interim accommodation is that there is ‘reason to believe’ someone is homeless (and meets the other criteria). This is a deliberately low threshold. It is for councils to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether this threshold is met, but by telling Mr J he needed to prove he was homeless, it appears the Council was applying a higher threshold than required by law.
40. Even putting this point to one side though, by accepting the relief duty, the Council had already decided Mr J was homeless. Regardless of the threshold, therefore, I cannot understand why the Council then told Mr J he needed to provide evidence to show he was homeless. And, to make matters worse, it does not appear the Council actually gave any consideration to the evidence Mr J did provide, showing he was living in his car.
41. The Council was therefore at fault in more than one way here. It failed to review Mr J’s priority need when it received updated evidence in June; it applied the wrong legal threshold to the test of whether he was homeless; overlooked the fact it had already decided he was homeless; and, even accepting Mr J did not need to prove he was homeless, it did not consider the supporting evidence he did provide.
42. In response to my enquiries, the Council offered to pay Mr J £150 in recognition of the injustice caused by its fault. Again, while this is positive, I am not satisfied this adequately reflects the situation Mr J was left in. This is particularly so once Mr J became street homeless. For reasons of confidentiality I have not described Mr J’s physical disabilities, but I accept that living in his car made these conditions particularly difficult to manage.
43. Had the Council not been at fault, Mr J would instead have been in interim accommodation, probably from approximately the end of June. Therefore, I consider the injustice caused by the Council’s fault was that Mr J spent approximately two months homeless, including one month street homeless, when he should have been in accommodation.
44. Our published guidance on remedies says that, where a person is left in unsuitable accommodation due to fault, we will recommend the relevant council offer a remedy of between £150 and £350 per month, depending on their particular circumstances.
45. I consider a remedy of £150 is appropriate for the period where Mr J was homeless, but staying with friends and family, because of the obvious lesser impact of this. For the period where Mr J was street homeless, given the significant impact of his disabilities in this environment, I consider a remedy of £350 to be appropriate.
46. The Council has also offered Mr J £100 to reflect his time and trouble in making a complaint. However, we will only recommend such a remedy where there has been notably poor complaint handling by the relevant body, such as serious delays. Although Mr J was dissatisfied with the Council’s response to his complaint, there were no such delays here, or any other examples of poor handling, and so I do not consider a time and trouble remedy to be necessary here.
47. For the avoidance of doubt, therefore, I consider the Council should offer Mr J a remedy of £500 in total.
48. I find fault causing injustice in this element of Mr J’s complaint.

Delay in payment of initial costs

49. The Council’s records show Mr J applied to its deposit scheme on 5 July. There is no more information about this until 2 August, when the Council says it received a copy of Mr J’s tenancy agreement. Although the Council identified some error at this point, this was resolved on the same day, and on 7 August the case officer forwarded the application for approval.
50. On 23 August the Council rejected Mr J’s application, because it exceeded the newly introduced cap. On 27 August the case officer contacted the landlord and gained their agreement to a smaller incentive payment, which the Council then approved on 2 September and paid on 6 September.
51. Mr J has complained the Council did not begin to process his application for some time after receiving it, by which I assume he is referring to the initial delay between 5 July and 7 August. However, the Council explained to Mr J it could not seek authorisation for the payment until it had a copy of his signed tenancy agreement. The Council is entitled to include this requirement in its policy and there is no fault in it; and while it is unfortunate Mr J did not sign his tenancy agreement until 1 August, that was not in the Council’s control.
52. Mr J has also complained about the distress and confusion he was caused by the change in the amount the Council had offered to pay. I agree this was fault, although given the recent change in the Council’s policy, this appears to be an understandable mistake and not indicative of anything more significant.
53. I am also not persuaded the mistake caused any significant delay in the payment. The Council’s initial refusal of the application was on 23 August; it then approved it on 2 September, six working days later.
54. More generally, the Council has explained the approval process for the deposit scheme can take up to 28 days. Taking the start date as 2 August (when the Council received the correct copy of the tenancy agreement), that means the approval process took one working day over this estimate. Again, this is not a significant delay and does not represent fault.
55. In saying this, I do not overlook the fact Mr J was street homeless during this period, and that his landlord would not agree a move-in date until they had received the payment. However, this was caused by the Council’s failure to provide Mr J with interim accommodation when it should have done – not by any additional fault with the process of agreeing and making the payment.
56. Therefore, I find fault by the Council in this aspect of Mr J’s complaint, but only insofar as it initially told him it could pay the higher amount. There is no fault in the overall time taken to process the payment; and while Mr J remained homeless during that time, this was because of the Council’s faulty decision on his priority need.
57. I find fault which did not cause injustice in this element of Mr J’s complaint.

Back to top

Action

58. Within one month of the date of my final decision, the Council should:

• write a formal letter of apology to Mr J, acknowledging the fault I have identified and the injustice this caused him. We publish guidance on remedies which sets out our expectations for how organisations should apologise effectively to remedy injustice. The Council should consider this guidance in making the apology I have recommended in my findings;
• offer to pay Mr J £500; and
• issue guidance to officers in its homelessness department. The guidance should explain:

• upon receipt of new and potentially relevant evidence, officers should promptly review any decision they have made about an applicant’s priority need, or any other part of the eligibility criteria for homelessness duties. They should make a clear record of their decision and the reasons for it; and
• the legal basis of the ‘reason to believe’ threshold and what it means in practice.

59. The Council should circulate a copy of this decision to officers as part of this guidance.
60. The Council should provide us with evidence it has complied with the above actions.

Back to top

Decision

61. I find fault causing injustice.

Investigator’s decision on behalf of the Ombudsman

Back to top

Investigator's decision on behalf of the Ombudsman