Summary: Miss D complained the Council delayed in deciding if it owed the main housing duty to her when she became homeless and that it placed her in unsuitable accommodation. We upheld complaints about these matters as well as finding poor complaint handling by the Council. These faults caused injustice to Miss D including that of living in unsuitable accommodation for three years. The Council accepts these findings and has agreed action set out at the end of this statement to remedy that injustice.

The complaint

1. I have called the complainant ‘Miss D’. She complained the Council:

• delayed in establishing if it owed the main housing duty to her after she presented as homeless in October 2019;
• failed to respond to concerns that interim accommodation she was provided with was unsuitable;
• failed to provide her with correct information when it accepted the main housing duty in October 2021;
• failed to consider if she had established a local connection with another London Borough where she has been living in interim or temporary accommodation since October 2019;
• failed to answer her complaint and then closed its investigation without her consent or advising her of this action.

2. Miss D says her living conditions have caused her and her children distress and anxiety. Miss D also says she has been caused prolonged uncertainty because of the Council’s handling of her request for support because of homelessness.

Back to top

The Ombudsman’s role and powers

3. We cannot investigate late complaints unless we decide there are good reasons. Late complaints are when someone takes more than 12 months to complain to us about something a council has done. (Local Government Act 1974, sections 26B and 34D, as amended)
4. The law says we cannot normally investigate a complaint when someone could take the matter to court. However, we may decide to investigate if we consider it would be unreasonable to expect the person to go to court. (Local Government Act 1974, section 26(6)(c), as amended)
5. We investigate complaints of injustice caused by ‘maladministration’ and ‘service failure’. I have used the word fault to refer to these. We consider whether there was fault in the way an organisation made its decision. If there was no fault in the decision making, we cannot question the outcome. (Local Government Act 1974, section 34(3), as amended)
6. We must also consider whether any fault has had an adverse impact on the person making the complaint. I refer to this as ‘injustice’. If there has been fault which has caused an injustice, we may suggest a remedy. (Local Government Act 1974, sections 26(1) and 26A(1), as amended)
7. If we are satisfied with an organisation’s actions or proposed actions, we can complete our investigation and issue a decision statement. (Local Government Act 1974, section 30(1B) and 34H(i), as amended)

Back to top

How I considered this complaint

8. Before issuing this decision statement I considered:

• Miss D’s written complaint to the Ombudsman and any supporting information she provided;
• information provided by the Council in response to written enquiries;
• any relevant law or Government guidance relevant to the case and referred to in the text below;
• relevant guidance published by the Ombudsman, including that on remedying complaints.

9. Miss D and the Council also had chance to comment on a draft version of this decision statement. I considered any comments they made, and any further evidence provided, before issuing this final decision statement.

Back to top

What I found

Relevant law and guidance

10. Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 and the Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities set out councils’ powers and duties to people who are homeless or threatened with homelessness.
11. Since April 2018, councils have been under a duty first to try and prevent homelessness where someone has accommodation available to them. When this prevention duty has ended, the Council has a ‘relief duty’ that requires it to take reasonable steps to help to secure suitable accommodation for any eligible homeless person. When a council decides this duty has come to an end, it must notify the applicant in writing (Housing Act 1996, section 189B)
12. A council will apply four tests to decide what, if any, duty it owes to a homeless applicant. Councils will owe the main housing duty to an applicant if inquiries find they are:

• eligible for assistance;
• homeless or threatened with homelessness;
• in priority need (for example, they are vulnerable, have dependent children etc.);
• not intentionally homeless.

13. There are no statutory time limits for completing inquiries. However, the Homelessness Code of Guidance recommends that councils aim to complete their inquiries within 33 working days.
14. A council must secure interim accommodation for applicants and their household if it has reason to believe they may be homeless, eligible for assistance and have a priority need. (Housing Act 1996, section 188)
15. The law says councils must ensure all accommodation provided to homeless applicants is suitable for the needs of the applicant and members of his or her household. This duty applies to interim accommodation and accommodation provided under the main homelessness duty. (Housing Act 1996, section 206 and (from 3 April 2018) Homelessness Code of Guidance 17.2)
16. If a council decides an applicant has a local connection with the district of another housing authority in England, it has discretion to refer their case to that authority at the point of the relief duty or when deciding if the main housing duty is met.
17. Before making a referral the notifying authority must decide if the conditions for referral are met. A local connection is one where the applicant:

• is, or has been in the past, normally resident there, and that residence was of their own choice; or,
• they are employed there; or,
• they have family associations living there; or,
• because of any special circumstances. (Homelessness Code of Guidance, 10.4)

18. Guidance says ‘normal residence’ means ‘the place where at the relevant time the person in fact resides.’ It says residence in temporary accommodation provided by a housing authority can constitute normal residence of choice and can contribute towards a local connection. (Homelessness Code of Guidance, 10.5)
19. But the guidance goes on to describe the conditions which must be satisfied before a referral may be made. It says a council can only “refer an applicant to whom the relief duty or main housing duty applies to another housing authority if all of the following are met”:

• neither the applicant nor any person who might reasonably be expected to live with them has a local connection with its district; and
• the applicant or a person who might reasonably be expected to live with them has a local connection with the district of the authority to be notified; and
• none of them will be at risk of domestic abuse or other violence, or threat of domestic abuse or other violence which is likely to be carried out, in the district of the authority to be notified. (my emphasis)

Or:

• the application is made within two years of the applicants acceptance of a private rented sector offer from the other authority: and
• neither the applicant or any person who might reasonably be expected to live with them will be at risk of domestic abuse or other violence, or threat of domestic abuse or other violence which is likely to be carried out, in the district of the authority to be notified.

Or:

• the applicant was placed in the authority’s district by another authority as a result of a previous homelessness application to the other authority; and
• the fresh application for assistance has been made within a prescribed period of the of the first application. The ‘prescribed period’ is five years plus the period between the date of the previous application and the date the applicant was first placed in accommodation in the district of the authority to whom the application is now made. (Homelessness Code of Guidance, 10.51)

20. Homeless applicants may request a review within 21 days of being notified of certain decisions, including:

• the suitability of accommodation offered to the applicant after a homelessness duty has been accepted.

21. The review must be carried out by someone who was not involved in the original decision and who is more senior to the original decision maker. The reviewing officer needs to consider any information relevant to the period before the decision was made (even if only obtained afterwards) as well as any new relevant information the Council has obtained since the decision. (The Homelessness (Review Procedure etc.) Regulations 2018, Homelessness Code of Guidance Chapter 19)
22. Councils must complete a review of the suitability of accommodation within eight weeks. A review decision must advise applicant of their right to appeal to the county court on a point of law, and of the period in which to appeal. (Housing Act 1996, sections 202, 203 and 204)

Key Events

23. Below I set out what I consider are the key events forming the background to this complaint. This does not cover all interactions between Miss D and the Council, nor all activity recorded in the Council’s records.

Background

24. Miss D moved to the Council’s area in May 2018 when she was accommodated in a refuge after fleeing domestic violence. Her ex-partner and children remained living in accommodation located in, and rented by, another London Borough – I will call that authority ‘LBX’. Miss D has three children, two girls and a boy, all of primary school age. Miss D’s son is disabled. He has limited mobility, uses a wheelchair and is doubly incontinent.
25. Miss D approached the Council for support with housing in October 2019 after her ex-partner relinquished his care of their children. The Council provided interim (or emergency) accommodation located in a third London Borough that I will call ‘LBY’. It is a one-bed basement flat with stairs to the entrance.

Events relevant to the complaint about the Council’s delay in deciding whether it owed Miss D the full housing duty

26. In the weeks that followed Miss D’s move to emergency accommodation, the Council was contacted by a solicitor acting for Miss D. She said Miss D was seeking a court order to require her ex-partner’s eviction from the property located in LBX, so she could return there. The Council asked Miss D to keep it updated.
27. In February 2020, Miss D told the Council that LBX would provide her with three-bed accommodation. The Council sought several times in the months that followed to obtain a further update from Miss D.
28. In July 2020 LBX told the Council that Miss D was not registered as living at her former address and implied it was not giving any active consideration to her case. The following month, Miss D’s solicitor said Miss D would not seek to enforce any court order entitling her to return to her former address. The reason for this being the property in LBX was a one-bed property and so unsuitable to meet the needs of the family. Also, in August 2020, LBX told the Council that while it would support Miss D if she had a court order to return to her former property it otherwise considered it owed no duty to support her, as she was not its tenant. It said it was unable to offer her a three-bed property.
29. In October 2020 the Council recorded Miss D telling it during a phone call that she wanted re-housing within its Borough and not within LBX.
30. In February 2021 the Council received contact from Miss D’s MP. They said, according to Miss D that LBX had “accepted [a] duty towards rehousing [Miss D]”. In reply the Council said it was expecting LBX to offer Miss D a property in the near future. This was also stated by Miss D in an email to the Council soon afterwards.
31. But in March 2021 LBX explained Miss D was on its general housing register but she was not its tenant. It implied she would be unlikely to be offered a property via the register. Something, it advised again in May 2021.
32. In October 2021 the Council made a decision that Miss D was homeless and in priority need. It decided she was not intentionally homeless and so it owed her the full housing duty.

Events relevant to the complaint about the suitability of Miss D’s emergency accommodation

33. While the Council was considering if it owed the full housing duty to Miss D it received several representations about the suitability of her interim or emergency accommodation.

• In early November 2019 Miss D explained in an email the difficulties she was finding with the property. Miss D said the steps made the property unsuitable for her disabled child as he used a wheelchair. She explained she had nowhere to wash clothes. She also said the property had issues with bad smells and damp.
• In mid-November 2019 a social worker from LBY sent an email to the Council saying he considered the property “unsuitable for the needs of a child who is significantly disabled as [they do] not have easy access to enter the home”.
• In December 2019 Miss D’s solicitor said the property was unsuitable and they asked the Council to re-house her.
• In January 2021 Miss D’s MP raised the unsuitability of the property with the Council.

34. The Council took advice from an independent medical adviser in November 2019. They told the Council Miss D should be housed in ground floor accommodation without steps, or else a property with lift access. They said the property must be wheelchair accessible.
35. Internal emails show the Council recognised a need to move Miss D to alternative accommodation after it received this independent advice. It told Miss D in December 2019 that her name had been “added to our urgent move list and as soon as alternative accommodation becomes available you will be contacted”.
36. In February 2020 the Council recorded in a note on its file that one of its officers from the Homeless Emergency Accommodation Team (HEAT) telephoned Miss D to offer her a move to alternative accommodation. There is no record of where this accommodation was located, its size, rent and so on. The Council’s notes say Miss D rejected the offer, understanding she was to receive an offer of three-bed accommodation from LBX in “a few weeks”.
37. In March 2020 the Council asked Miss D to update it, saying that its HEAT service may need to provide her with alternative emergency accommodation. Miss D did not reply to that email.
38. The next reference to providing alternative emergency accommodation is from July 2020, after the Council received an update from LBX. There are several enquiries from Miss D’s Housing Needs Officer thereafter asking the HEAT service to provide alternative accommodation. Each time they were told the service had no alternative suitable accommodation available.
39. In February 2022, after Miss D complained (see below), the Council sent an email to the letting agent responsible for managing Miss D’s property, asking it to investigate Miss D’s reports of poor property condition. There is no record of the Council receiving a reply to its enquiry nor following it up.
40. In general comments the Council has said to us that while it was “not ideal”, it considered the emergency accommodation it secured for Miss D was “the best possible at the time” being both “reasonable and suitable”.

The complaint the Council did not give Miss D correct information

41. Miss D says at no point did the Council write to her and explain if it had accepted that it owed ‘the relief duty’ to her; nor whether this had been extended after 56 days.
42. When the Council wrote to Miss D saying it owed her the full duty in October 2021, the letter referred to the Council providing her with accommodation in a hotel Miss D has never stayed in. The copy of the letter given to me by the Council does not contain this information. I note an email exchange between Miss D and the Council, suggests the Council re-issued the letter to her, with the correct address, when Miss D made it aware of its error.
43. Miss D also says the letter did not provide enough information on challenging the suitability of her accommodation, which became temporary as opposed to interim or emergency accommodation from October 2021 when the Council accepted the full housing duty. The letter referred to her having the right of review under “S.193 of the Act”, but did not specify which legislation it referred to, nor how she could request a review.

The complaint the Council has not considered if Miss D now has a local connection with LBY

44. In August 2021 Miss D told the Council she would be applying for housing to LBY as she now felt settled there. And in October 2021, after the Council accepted it owed the full duty to Miss D, she contacted it to say that she now considered she had established a local connection with LBY. She had lived in interim accommodation for two years and her children were settled in local schools. Her son was also under the care of a local GP and hospital.
45. There is no record of the Council replying to Miss D’s enquiry, but an internal email exchange recorded at the time the Council would not refer Miss D to LBY.
46. In reply to our enquiries the Council told us it has “no legal powers” to refer Miss D’s case to LBY. It has said that when it provides temporary accommodation in another council area this “does not confer a local connection”.

Miss D’s complaint to the Council

47. In January 2022 a complaint was made on Miss D’s behalf by an advice agency.
48. In March 2022 Miss D’s adviser received an acknowledgment from the Council, saying it would be replying to the complaint.
49. By July 2022 Miss D had received no reply and so contacted this office for advice. We contacted the Council to enquire why it had not replied to Miss D’s complaint. It told us it would do so as a matter of urgency.
50. In August 2022 a manager in the housing service contacted Miss D by telephone and agreed to meet with her. The Council initially told us at this point it closed the complaint. Subsequently the Council has told us it did not close the complaint at that time. But that it was ‘accepted’ by Miss D in September 2022, following a meeting with the manager described below, that her complaint was “no longer relevant”.
51. The meeting in September 2022 was attended by Miss D and her adviser. The housing manager sent an email to Miss D and her adviser after the meeting saying that:

• Miss D wanted to withdraw her application for housing assistance with the Council and apply to LBY instead;
• this was despite the Council having offered permanent accommodation to her;
• that Miss D had made this decision based on her personal circumstances and had not been pressured to do so, being aware of the consequences of her decision;
• the Council would send Miss D a letter to confirm she had withdrawn her application for housing assistance.

52. In their comments Miss D and her adviser have told me:

• Miss D was unaware the Council had ever closed her complaint at any point;
• that they believed the meeting in September 2022 was to discuss the complaint;
• that Miss D had never received an offer of permanent accommodation from the Council;
• that the Council had refused to give reasons at the meeting for not referring Miss D’s case to LBY;
• the manager told Miss D that if she wanted housing in LBY she must withdraw her application.

53. I asked the Council to clarify what offer of permanent accommodation it had made to Miss D. It told me that it had identified a three-bed property with a through lift and adapted shower, located within its Borough. It says Miss D stated she would not take the property as it was not located in LBY. The Council did not put any offer in writing to Miss D.
54. The Council said that it would proceed to evict Miss D from her temporary accommodation. During this investigation it sent a letter to Miss D to this effect. However, that was subsequently withdrawn to await the final decision in this case.

Findings

Approach to our jurisdiction

55. There are two potential barriers to our investigating all parts of Miss D’s complaint. First, there is the question of time. The events covered by this complaint go back more than twelve months and this was also the case when Miss D first made her complaint to the Council. Part of the complaint is late therefore.
56. However, I have decided that we should not decline to investigate on grounds of time. This is because Miss D complains about a continuing sequence of events that began in October 2019 when her children returned to live with her, and she approached the Council for help with housing. Clearly most of the matters Miss D complains about did not happen until the second half of 2021 (the culmination of the delay in accepting the full housing duty; the complaint about the content of the decision letter and the request for a referral to LBY). While it could be argued Miss D may have pursued the other part of her complaint sooner (the suitability of her interim accommodation) I do not consider it appropriate to exclude this from investigation. This is because I consider the evidence shows Miss D raised concerns about the accommodation on moving into it and did not drop those at any point.
57. The second jurisdiction consideration is that of the ‘alternative remedy’. Where a complainant has a statutory right of review to a court of law, then we must consider if that person should use, or have used that right, as an alternative to complaining to the Ombudsman.
58. The matter is relevant in this case as Miss D had a statutory right to a review of the suitability of her accommodation at the point the Council accepted it owed the full housing duty to her (October 2021). In the event the Council then failed to respond to that review request in the statutory timescale (eight weeks) or provided a response Miss D was dissatisfied with, she would have then had the right to go to the county court.
59. For reasons I explain below, I find the Council adequately explained that right to Miss D in October 2021. However, I consider there are exceptional factors which justify investigation into the suitability of Miss D’s accommodation throughout the events covered by this complaint. I explained above there is evidence which shows the Council accepted Miss D needed alternative accommodation from December 2019 onward. This is discussed in more detail below. But at no point does the Council appear to have changed its mind as its occasional efforts to secure alternative temporary accommodation continued. For example, an internal email in November 2021 said the Council needed to move Miss D “urgently”. Miss D did not need to request a review therefore. Because the Council had already accepted her temporary accommodation was unacceptable and was looking for an alternative.

The delay in completing inquiries

60. Turning to the substance of the complaint, I noted above there is no statutory timescale in which a Council must complete inquiries when deciding if it owes the main housing duty to someone who presents as homeless. However, guidance suggests that councils should aim to complete inquiries in 33 working days.
61. In this case it took the Council around fifteen times longer than this timescale to reach a decision on Miss D’s case. I accept her case was not straightforward. Initially the Council was told by Miss D’s solicitor that there was a prospect Miss D would return to her former accommodation in LBX. It was not clarified until August 2020 that was no longer the case.
62. Then there was also some confusion about whether LBX might otherwise re-house Miss D. The Council’s records from August 2020 onward do not indicate that LBX ever suggested this possibility. But confusion arose from statements made by Miss D and her MP. However, given the consistency of what LBX told the Council I cannot see why Miss D’s statements prevented the Council reaching its decision it before October 2021.
63. This suggests a lack of focus in how the Council approached Miss D’s case. I find little consistency or coherence in how the Council applied itself to inquiries. Nowhere did officers set out their thinking about what they needed to establish from LBX and its relevance to any decision about whether it owed the main housing duty. Nowhere did they address the inconsistency between Miss D’s statements about LBX re-housing her with what that authority told it.
64. This drift is also found in the Council’s application to the powers brought in by the Homeless Reduction Act in April 2018 which introduced the concept of the ‘relief duty’. I have seen no reference to the Council explaining if it was looking to re-house Miss D under the ‘relief duty’ at any time. So, it is not possible to say if the Council ever took the view that it was supporting Miss D under this duty and if so when that support ended.
65. I consider there was at least 15 months of unnecessary delay therefore in the Council deciding whether it owed the full housing duty to Miss D.
66. The injustice caused to Miss D by this delay was that of uncertainty, which we regard as a form of distress.

The complaint about the suitability of the emergency accommodation

67. In considering this next part of the complaint, I am concerned by the comment made by the Council in response to my enquiries that the emergency or interim accommodation it secured for Miss D in October 2019 was suitable at the time. This goes against the evidence on the file. Because the Council’s own officers recognised Miss D needed alternative accommodation from December 2019. This followed representations made by and on behalf of Miss D explaining the difficulties caused by her accommodation due to his size and lack of adaptations for her disabled child. It also followed the advice it received from its independent medical adviser.
68. I recognise that there is evidence Miss D had the opportunity to move to alternative interim accommodation in February 2020. At the time she was still pursuing the possibility of returning to her former accommodation in LBX and/or under the impression LBX would re-house her elsewhere. However, as noted above by August 2020 it was clear to the Council that Miss D would not be accommodated by LBX. Officers again recognised the need to offer alternative interim accommodation.
69. I accept the records suggest the Council made sporadic efforts after August 2020 to find that alternative accommodation and each time were frustrated by a lack of supply. But this inability to secure suitable interim accommodation must still result in a finding of service failure against the Council.
70. The resulting injustice being that Miss D has been required to stay in unsuitable interim accommodation causing significant hardship and distress for a further 28 months and counting.

The complaint about being provided with incorrect information

71. As I commented above, I find there was considerable drift and a lack of effective case management after Miss D first presented as homeless to the Council. I consider it was fault for the Council never to explain in writing to Miss D whether it had accepted it owed the relief duty to her, nor whether this was extended.
72. However, I am unable to find fault with the letter the Council sent Miss D when it told her that it had accepted the full duty to her in October 2021. I accept the letter Miss D received contained incorrect details about the address of her temporary accommodation. But the email trail suggests the Council quickly corrected this. I also consider this minor clerical error would not invalidate other information contained within the letter.
73. I consider it might have been helpful had the Council said more to Miss D about how she could exercise any appeal rights. However, Miss D was familiar with the letter’s author who was the same case officer she had corresponded with for two years. And the letter was clear in saying “you have the right to request a review of the suitability of this or any other accommodation provided”. So, I consider had Miss D wanted to ask for a review of the suitability of her accommodation at that time, the letter provided her with enough opportunity to do so.

The complaint Miss D has not been referred to LBY

74. On this point I can understand why Miss D believes she now has more of a connection with LBY than with the Council as her children are settled in school and her son is known to his local GP and hospital. However, I do not consider the Council is at fault for the position it has taken that it cannot refer Miss D to LBY.
75. Because while it is the case that temporary accommodation can count towards establishing a local connection, it is not a factor the Council can consider in isolation. Law and guidance explain that a range of conditions must be satisfied before the Council’s discretion to refer to another housing authority becomes engaged (see paragraph 19 above). I cannot see that all necessary conditions are satisfied here. Primarily because Miss D has a local connection with the Council’s area having lived there for over 12 months before she was placed in interim accommodation in LBY’s area. And having been placed in LBY by the Council, she has lived there for less than five years which is the ‘prescribed period’ for which living in temporary accommodation would count towards establishing a local connection.
76. It is disappointing however the Council did not explain this to Miss D when she first enquired and nor in response to her complaint.

The Council’s complaint handling

77. The Council is at fault for its complaint handling in this case. I find some effort must have been made initially to respond to Miss D’s concerns as there is evidence officers contacted the letting agent to make enquiries about the conditions of the temporary accommodation. But thereafter there was a communication breakdown, resulting in Miss D not receiving a reply. While such oversights are inevitable in organisations from time to time, this was brought to the Council’s attention between March and July 2022. It is unacceptable that no steps were taken to urgently answer Miss D’s complaint despite the assurances given to her advocate and this office.
78. I recognise from August 2022 a manager became involved in seeking to resolve Miss D’s concerns but there is no evidence to support the claim that Miss D ever wanted to withdraw her complaint or that it became ‘no longer relevant’ in September 2022. Not only do the notes of the meeting kept by the manager not say this, but they contain the statement “[Miss D] wanted to discuss complaint”, which suggests the opposite. There is also nothing in any written communications from Miss D or her advocate to support this account. The failure to reply to the complaint therefore continued up to the point where we began this investigation.
79. The Council has acted in a way which has sought to draw a line under the events complained about by Miss D, when, as is clear from my commentary above I find it should have explored the matters she raised. If nothing else, Miss D should have received a clear explanation of the Council’s position on her asserted local connection to LBY and a response to her concerns about the suitability of her accommodation.
80. I also note here the Council’s assertion that it offered accommodation to Miss D in discharge of the full housing duty. While I can accept the Council had alternative accommodation for Miss D in mind at the meeting in September 2022, I do not find this amounted to an offer of accommodation that would discharge its duty. It put nothing in writing to Miss D making such an offer.
81. Because the Council has failed to properly explain its position on these matters, I am concerned by the statement that Miss D has ‘agreed’ to withdraw her request for housing assistance from the Council. I do not see how she could make an informed choice on whether she should withdraw her request for housing assistance from the Council in these circumstances. That is part of her injustice.
82. A second injustice to Miss D is that of the time and trouble she has been put to in pursuing a complaint in the absence of any reply from the Council.

Summary

83. In summary therefore the Council is at fault in this case for:

• the delay in deciding whether it owed Miss D the full housing duty after she became homeless;
• placing Miss D in unsuitable interim or emergency accommodation that then became temporary accommodation once the Council accepted the full duty;
• its failure to answer Miss D’s complaint made in January 2022.

84. These failings have caused Miss D the following injustice:

• distress in the form of uncertainty, while waiting for the Council’s decision on her request for housing assistance;
• being required to live in unsuitable accommodation for a prolonged period of time;
• not being given the opportunity to make an informed choice on whether to withdraw her request for housing assistance;
• time and trouble.

85. The Council has accepted these findings and recommendations I made for how I t could remedy this injustice. Those recommendations took account of the Ombudsman’s published guidance on remedies. This says that where, as a result of an injustice, a complainant has had to stay in unsuitable accommodation we will recommend between £150 and £350 a month in recognition of this. Miss D’s case sits at the higher end of the tariff (£300 per month) given its limited size, the difficulties it creates in caring for her son and reports of disrepair.
86. However, I accepted the Council would have been faced with limited choice when Miss D first presented as homeless and so she could have been expected to remain there for a short time at the outset. It also offered alternative emergency accommodation in February 2020, and it was not until August 2020 the Council received information confirming Miss D would not be returning to LBX which reactivated its search for an alternative. The remedy therefore only covers the period from August 2020 onward.

Agreed action

87. To remedy the injustice caused to Miss D, the Council has agreed that within 20 working days of this decision, it will:
1. apologise to Miss D accepting the findings of this investigation;
2. pay Miss D a financial remedy of £9,100; made up of £250 in recognition of her distress; £8700 in recognition of the unsuitable accommodation from August 2020 onward (29 months x £300 to include December 2022); £150 in recognition of her time and trouble;
3. give Miss D 20 working days to clarify if she still wishes to withdraw her request for housing assistance from the Council in view of the findings of this investigation; if the Council receives nothing in writing from Miss D then it can assume she wishes to withdraw her request. The Council should make no move to end Miss D’s temporary accommodation (nor stop attempts to secure an alternative) in the interim; nor should it end attempts to discharge the full housing duty to Miss D - if it offers accommodation to Miss D in future in discharge of that duty, it must be in writing.
4. agree to pay Miss D a further £300 on 1 February 2023 should she remain in unsuitable temporary accommodation; and a further £300 on the first of every month thereafter until it has offered suitable alternative temporary accommodation or discharged the full housing duty or Miss D withdraws her request for housing assistance.
88. The Council should also consider what wider lessons it can learn from its handling of this case. I recommend that within three months of a decision on this complaint, the Council:
1. ensure that it has a process (or reviews an existing process) to identify and review cases where a decision on whether it owes the full housing duty are outstanding for more than three months to include management oversight and the encouragement of action plans to resolve whatever outstanding inquiries are delaying such a decision;
2. ensure that it has a process (or reviews an existing process) to cover cases where homeless households are in need of a change of emergency or temporary accommodation because of its unsuitability; while the Council will face shortages of supply and budgetary pressures it should still be seeking to meet its statutory duties and have a way of systematically prioritising and reviewing such cases;
3. ensure that it has a process (or reviews an existing process) to identify complaints made about its housing services that have exceeded timescales for a reply under its corporate complaints procedure; this should include identifying who has oversight of such cases and ways for escalating concerns about non-response to senior managers.
89. The Council should provide us with evidence it has complied with the above actions.

Back to top

Final decision

90. For reasons set out above I uphold this complaint finding fault by the Council causing injustice to Miss D. The Council has agreed action that I consider will remedy that injustice. Consequently, I can now complete my investigation satisfied with its response.

Back to top

Investigator's decision on behalf of the Ombudsman