Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council (21 009 235)

Category : Environment and regulation > Antisocial behaviour

Decision : Upheld

Decision date : 04 Sep 2022

The Ombudsman's final decision:

Summary: Ms X complained about a lack of action by the Council in response to her complaints of anti-social behaviour. While the Council did not follow the correct procedures, it did take action but has not gathered sufficient evidence to enable it to take action against any perpetrators. There is also fault in how it responded to a community trigger request. A suitable remedy has been agreed.

The complaint

  1. Ms X complained the Council ha failed to take action in response to complaints of anti-social behaviour following a decision to locate a market behind her property
  2. Ms X says her mental health deteriorated due to the problems experienced.

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The Ombudsman’s role and powers

  1. We investigate complaints about ‘maladministration’ and ‘service failure’. In this statement, I have used the word fault to refer to these. We must also consider whether any fault has had an adverse impact on the person making the complaint. I refer to this as ‘injustice’. If there has been fault which has caused an injustice, we may suggest a remedy. (Local Government Act 1974, sections 26(1) and 26A(1), as amended)
  2. If we are satisfied with an organisation’s actions or proposed actions, we can complete our investigation and issue a decision statement. (Local Government Act 1974, section 30(1B) and 34H(i), as amended)

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How I considered this complaint

  1. As part of the investigation, I have:
    • considered the complaint and the documents provided by the complainant;
    • made enquiries of the Council and considered the comments and documents the Council provided;
    • discussed the issues with the complainant;
    • sent my draft decision to both the Council and the complainant and taken account of their comments in reaching my final decision.

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What I found

The law and policy on the Community Trigger process

  1. Sections 104 and 105 of the Antisocial Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 provides a mechanism known as the ‘Community Trigger’ process. This allows for a review of the case where a locally determined threshold is met. It is a means of giving victims and communities a say in how antisocial behaviour (ASB) is addressed. It is intended as a safety net for those who believe they have not had a satisfactory response to their complaints about ASB.
  2. The Council is part of a Community Safety Partnership consisting of statutory and voluntary partners. The Ombudsman can only consider the Council’s action in a Community Trigger review. Any contribution made by other relevant bodies is not in the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. The Community Safety Partnership has an ASB Vulnerable and Repeat Victims Policy and a Community Trigger Policy.
  3. The procedure for requesting a community trigger states that an acknowledgement must be sent within three working days and requests for information from partners will be made within five working days. A decision on whether the community trigger threshold has been met will be made within 15 working days. The threshold in this case is three reports of ASB or one report of a hate crime to any partner within the last six months.

Key facts

  1. Ms X says that she has been complaining to the Council since 2017 about ASB after the Council relocated the market to the area outside her property. However, she says that the problems got worse when the stalls were left permanently erected due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms X contacted the Council on 11 June 2020 to complain about the issues in the market square. This resulted in the Council asking for community support workers to patrol the area and for CCTV monitoring.
  2. Ms X contacted the Council again on 29 November. The Council provided a response to Ms X on the action that had been taken since her previous complaint. The Council says it also gave her advice on seeking support for her mental health issues. The Council says that it received a report saying nothing had been observed during patrols or on CCTV.
  3. In 2021, Ms X was mainly making reports of ASB to the police. The Council does not have any reports on its system until August 2021 but Ms X has provided evidence to show she was in contact with the market department directly. It is possible these reports were not passed onto the ASB officers. Ms X contacted a local newspaper in January 2021. The report mentions that Ms X had received homophobic abuse and harassment. The Council issued statements in response to the newspaper report saying that it was unable to remove the stalls as it would not be possible for the workers to do this and remain two meters apart. It said it was monitoring the situation and working with the police as well as investigating the allegations of hate crimes.
  4. In August 2021 Ms X contacted her elected councillors about the issues in the area. The councillors raised the concerns with the Council and the police. The notes provided by the Council indicated officers discussed Ms X’s vulnerability and whether a referral should be made to the partnership panel. While I do not have any information on the decision reached, there is no evidence the matter was referred to the panel at this time.
  5. Ms X contacted the Ombudsman in September 2021. As the matter had not been considered through the Council’s complaints procedure, we referred it back to the Council on 9 November 2021.
  6. The Council responded to Ms X’s complaint on 23 December 2021. It explained that the market runs from Thursday through to Sunday each week. The arrangement was for the market to be erected at 5 pm on a Wednesday and then dismantled on a Sunday evening. However, the Council made the decision during the pandemic that the stalls should remain all week. It did this to protect its workers. It explained that as the country moved out of restrictions, it faced a staff shortage and so the stalls remained in situ all week. The Council said it hoped to have recruited more staff by February 2022 and it would then remove the stalls on a Monday morning each week.
  7. The Council’s response also noted that between January 2020 and September 2021, a total of 39 reports of ASB were made to the Council and the police. It said the matters investigated by the police were closed with no action taken. It said it did not make a referral to the ASB vulnerability panel as most of the logs were crime related and it did not consider Ms X was vulnerable. However, it says it has now seen new information and agreed to make a referral to the vulnerability panel. It said it would consider her case on 11 January 2022. It concluded that the complaint was not upheld as it had increased patrols and officers had been in contact with her.
  8. The ASB vulnerability panel considered Ms X’s case on 11 January 2022. The notes of the meeting shared with me indicate that victim support had just begun working with Ms X. It was noted that CCTV did not show anything and nothing had been seen when officers were on patrol in the area. It agreed to look into whether the market stalls could be dismantled.
  9. Ms X contacted the Council on 12 January 2022 saying she needed help and asking what she could do to trigger a review of her case. The notes indicate the Council considered Ms X to be a low vulnerability complainant. Information provided by the Council indicates it contacted Ms X but it has not provided a copy of any email or letter sent to her. It says it provided feedback on the community trigger process and that because her case was with the Panel and under investigation there was no requirement for a community trigger. There is nothing to suggest the Council contacted other members of the community safety partnership to get information about reports made by Ms X in the previous six months.
  10. Ms X contacted the Council again on 20 January 2022. She expressed her dissatisfaction at the advice given regarding the community trigger. The Council responded on 21 January (again I have not seen a copy of this communication) saying it clarified the community trigger threshold and that the community trigger was not initiated because of the investigation and actions currently in place to support Ms X.
  11. Ms X’s case was again considered at the ASB panel on 8 February 2022. It reported that the market stalls close to Ms X’s address would be taken down in March and adjustments made to the stalls to make them less appealing for people to congregate around. The police provided details of patrols that would take place. Discussion also took place regarding Ms X’s mental health and housing issues.
  12. The case was also considered at the next ASB panel on 8 March 2022. It was reported that Ms X had made no further calls since 6 January. Officers were continuing to patrol the area and had called on Ms X but she had not been home on any occasion. It also reported that officers attend a call by a member of the public which resulted in a group of youths being issued warning letters. It was reported that Ms X was staying with a friend.
  13. In April CCTV monitoring noticed youths congregating but did not show any known identities or concerns about their behaviour.

Analysis

  1. Ms X complains the Council has failed to take action in respect of ASB near her property. The information provided indicates the Council works in partnership in respect of ASB matters. I am only considering the actions of the Council.
  2. The Council does not have its own ASB policy or procedure. It says that it uses the approach set out in the Community Safety Partnership guidance manual. This document is not publicly available.
  3. This manual says that it has an agreed ASB service standard which sets out how it supports victims and witnesses. It says this includes contacting victims as soon as possible and works with them to resolve their problem; ensure suitable action and support is offered; keep victims regularly updated. It says that in all appropriate cases a lead officer will be appointed and this officer will ensure that victims are given information about ASB services and procedures, given witness diaries to record evidence of ASB; offered support through a referral to Victim Support and regularly update them with the progress of the case.
  4. The information provided to me by the Council in respect of its actions does not show it followed the procedure set out in the Partnership Manual. While there was some initial contact with Ms X after receiving her complaint on 11 June, there is no evidence that it sent details of the ASB process and service, no diary sheets were sent, no referral to victim support and there was no communication after 11 June to update her of progress. This is fault.
  5. On 29 November 2020, Ms X made a further complaint about ASB in the market area. The Council gave Ms X advice about seeking support for mental health issues and requested the CCTV monitoring. Information was provided to the Council on 1 December 2020 from the patrols and CCTV monitoring but there is nothing to suggest the Council contacted Ms X to update the situation. This is fault.
  6. As explained above, I can only consider the actions of the Council and not of the other members of the Community Safety Partnership. In 2021, Ms X mainly made complaints to the Police although I have now seen some evidence to show she did contact the Council, specifically the markets team. When responding to my enquiries the Council said there were no reports on its system until August 2021. If complaints were made to the markets team and these were not forwarded or discussed with the ASB team, this would be fault. A clear policy/procedure for departments on how to deal with such situations could be helpful to ensure this does not happen again.
  7. Councillors raised issues on Mrs X’s behalf in August 2021. While the information provided by the Council indicates it took action and contacted other partners about the issues, there is no evidence of contact with Ms X. Concerns were raised about Ms X’s mental health and there was consideration of a referral to the vulnerability panel but no information has been provided to show exactly why the Council did not consider this appropriate. Again, I consider the failure to take action in line with the guidance manual to be fault.
  8. In January 2022, following contact between the Ombudsman and the Council, Ms X’s case was referred to the vulnerability panel. It is not clear if this referral was due to new information or a reconsideration. The panel notes show the Council was taking action regarding the reported ASB but that there was insufficient evidence to take any further action.
  9. The information provided indicates the Council, through the Community Safety Partnership, was taking action in respect of Ms X’s complaints of ASB. Patrols were taking place in the area and CCTV was being monitored. It was also looking at when it could start removing the market stalls, particularly those near to Ms X’s property, on the days the market is not operating. Action on this has been delayed for various reasons including a lack of staff. While it appears the Council has tried to address this issue it has not achieved what it promised Ms X and this service failure amounts to fault.
  10. While there is evidence the Council has not followed the correct procedures, I am not persuaded the outcome would have been significantly different even if the fault had not occurred. The Council has monitored and patrolled the area and sought to find evidence that would then enable it to act. The issue is still active with the Community Safety Partnership although the Council says Ms X has not made any further complaints since January 2022.
  11. Ms X requested a community trigger in January 2022. The Council refused Ms X’s request on the basis that the matter was with the panel and under investigation. The guidance manual does not indicate that this is a basis for refusing a trigger request. The threshold for a community trigger is based on three complaints, made to any partner, within the last six months. The Council’s decision to decline Ms X’s community trigger request on the basis of the current action it was taking is not in accordance with the published criteria and therefore fault.
  12. It is possible that Ms X had not made enough complaints within the previous six months to meet the community trigger threshold. However, there is no evidence the Council sought information from other partners, particularly the police, to check if the threshold was met. This is fault.
  13. While I appreciate that the Community Safety Partnership involves many, if not all, the agencies that would also attend a community trigger review, this is a different process. It would give Ms X the opportunity to explain the harm the ASB is causing to her and allow her an opportunity to say what she thinks should happen. It should focus on fixing the problem and devising an action plan to resolve the issues. The failure to properly consider the community trigger threshold and possibly to carry out the process has caused further distress and uncertainty to Ms X.

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Agreed action

  1. To remedy the injustice caused to Ms X as a result of the faults identified the Council will, within one month of my final decision, take the following action:
    • Apologise to Ms X for its failings;
    • Review the situation in respect of the community trigger to establish if the threshold was met in January 2022 and if so, now complete the trigger process;
    • Pay Ms X £250 to recognise the frustration, distress and uncertainty suffered;
    • Ensure information about ASB procedures and the community trigger is available to the general public including on the Council’s website;
    • Carry out a review of current procedures and advice to staff about how to respond to ASB complaints to determine whether a specific council policy on ASB is required.

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Final decision

  1. I have completed my investigation with a finding of fault for the reasons explained in this statement. The Council has agreed to implement the actions I have recommended. These appropriately remedy any injustice caused by fault.

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Investigator's decision on behalf of the Ombudsman

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