Summary: The Council was not initially at fault for efforts it made to deliver education to Mrs X’s daughter after she stopped attending school. However, it was at fault for a subsequent delay in arranging tuition. This meant Mrs X’s daughter missed out on at least some education for a two-month period. The Council has agreed to make a symbolic payment to recognise her injustice.

The complaint

1. Mrs X says that, between February and October 2024, the Council failed to meet its duty to deliver alternative educational provision to her daughter, Y, while she was out of school. Mrs X says Y did not receive a suitable full-time education during this period.
2. Mrs X says the Council tried to place Y in three different settings but none of them were right for her.
3. Mrs X says Y’s school did try to deliver some alternative provision – including art and equine therapies, and home tuition – but they were not suitable. She says:
• The art therapy was initially on the school premises (which was unsuitable for Y), and then, after the school changed the venue to Y’s home, it was inconvenient (as Mrs X had a family emergency).
• The venue for the equine therapy was not suitable for Y following a risk assessment.
• The home ‘tuition’ was not actually teaching Y – it was just playing board games for an hour a week. And it only happened twice, after Mrs X complained.

Back to top

The Ombudsman’s role and powers

4. We investigate complaints about ‘maladministration’ and ‘service failure’. In this statement, I have used the word fault to refer to these. We must also consider whether any fault has had an adverse impact on the person making the complaint. I refer to this as ‘injustice’. If there has been fault which has caused significant injustice, or that could cause injustice to others in the future we may suggest a remedy. (Local Government Act 1974, sections 26(1) and 26A(1), as amended)
5. If we are satisfied with a council’s actions or proposed actions, we can complete our investigation and issue a decision statement. (Local Government Act 1974, section 30(1B) and 34H(1), as amended)
6. Under our information sharing agreement, we will share this decision with the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted).

Back to top

How I considered this complaint

7. I considered evidence provided by Mrs X and the Council as well as relevant law.
8. Mrs X and the Council had an opportunity to comment on my draft decision. I considered any comments before making a final decision.

Back to top

What I found

The law

9. Councils must arrange suitable education for children who are out of school because of exclusion, illness or for other reasons, if they would not receive suitable education without such arrangements (Education Act 1996, section 19). We refer to this as ‘section 19’ or ‘alternative’ provision.
10. Alternative provision must be full-time unless the council decides this would not be in the child’s best interests for reasons of their physical or mental health. (Education Act 1996, sections 3A and 3AA)
11. A child or young person with special educational needs may have an education, health and care (EHC) plan. This document sets out the child’s needs and what arrangements should be made to meet them. (Children and Families Act 2014, section 37)

What happened

12. Following a period of time in which Y’s behaviour in school had deteriorated and become difficult for the school to manage – resulting in two fixed-term exclusions – she stopped attending school in early February 2024.
13. Y’s social worker reported that the school wanted to permanently exclude Y, but the Council opposed this because it “did not want to punish her for [a] suspected trauma response”.
14. The Council met with the school, which confirmed that it was in the process of arranging tuition for Y. The school was also receiving support from another local school, which was setting up a specialist ‘nurture’ provision to “replace missing or distorted early nurturing experiences”.
15. In the meantime, Y’s school arranged for her to attend a ‘specialist inclusion room’ at another school within the same academy group. But this arrangement broke down “following [Y’s] reaction to staff”. Y did not want to stay there.
16. Y’s school also arranged some art therapy for her. But Mrs X says this was initially unsuitable (because it was on school premises), and then, after the venue was changed, was inconvenient (because of a family emergency). None of the therapy was delivered.
17. In late February, the tuition service which the school had been arranging decided it could not deliver support to Y.
18. The Council recommended an alternative education provider to Y’s school, and, in early March, the school met with the provider. It offered Y ‘bespoke’ sessions to support her back into school.
19. This provision was available to Y until the end of April. However, it was only delivered twice because Mrs X complained about it. She says there was no teaching element, and it was just playing board games for an hour a week.
20. In mid-April, the Council spoke to the local school which offered the ‘nurture’ provision. The school confirmed that this provision was available from mid-May.
21. Y began attending this nurture provision in May. Although Mrs X then took Y abroad to visit family for two weeks, the placement remained available.
22. In early June, the nurture provision reported that Y displayed “extreme levels of physical violence towards staff”. This led to the placement being ended.
23. The Council consulted two tuition providers and passed the details of one of them onto Y’s school so it could refer her. But, by mid-July, the school had not progressed the referral. The Council challenged the school about this, and the school agreed to look into it.
24. In early September, Y’s school arranged an alternative provision programme involving horses. But Mrs X says this was subsequently deemed unsuitable for Y. She did not attend any sessions.
25. In mid-September, Y’s school referred her to a tuition service, and she started this in early October. This was initially for two hours a week.
26. Later in October, the Council issued Y’s EHC plan, naming Y’s existing school. Mrs X was given a right of appeal to the SEND Tribunal. At that point, the Tribunal gained jurisdiction for matters arising from the decision to name Y’s school in the plan (including her inability to attend the school), and the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction ended.
27. In April 2025, Mrs X made a complaint to the Council about the educational provision it had arranged for Y. It responded, saying that, although Y was only accessing education for one day a week, this arrangement was made in collaboration with professionals and was intended to help reintegrate Y into formal education.
28. However, the Council accepted that it has not delivered suitable, full-time educational provision to Y. It also accepted that “this situation should have been resolved sooner”. It apologised to Mrs X.
29. In my correspondence with the Council, it said any provision Y received was not full-time because she was not able to access full-time education. It said the decisions to offer part-time provision were based on her needs, and the “interventions were intentionally introduced gradually to build engagement and prevent permanent exclusion”.

My findings

30. It is not the Ombudsman’s role to decide whether a child’s education is (or was) suitable. We can only consider whether a council has followed correct procedure. Any judgments on the quality or suitability of education can only be made by the professionals working with a child, or the SEND Tribunal.
31. When a child cannot attend school – for any reason – the duty lies with their local education authority (the Council) to make alternative arrangements.
32. If the child’s school has already made suitable alternative arrangements, then there may be no reason for the council to step in. But, as the duty ultimately lies with the council, it must certainly be able to demonstrate that it has considered each case on its merits. Any decision not to make alternative arrangements for a child’s education should be properly evidenced and explained.
33. In Y’s case, the Council had oversight of her educational provision from the day she stopped attending school.
34. From February (when Y stopped attending) until June 2024, Y’s school arranged several different providers to deliver education to Y in different ways. Some of this was at home, some at school, and some at other venues. All of these arrangements broke down.
35. The fact that an educational arrangement broke down does not automatically mean that it should be judged to have been unsuitable from the start. The Council was aware that Y’s school had arranged alternative provision for Y (and, in one case prior to June 2024, had itself recommended the provider). Its view was that the provision would be suitable to meet Y’s complex needs and would help reintegrate her into a school environment. I have no remit to question this view.
36. Although much of Y’s provision was not full-time, the Council believes that she would not have been able to manage more hours than she was offered. Given the lack of success of the part-time provision, I have no reason to challenge the Council on this.
37. With the above in mind, I have found no fault with the Council for the efforts it made between February and June 2024.
38. After the nurture provision ended in June, the Council suggested that Y’s school approach another tuition provider. But the school did not do this. Although the Council challenged the school about it, no further tuition was offered to Y until October – which, taking into account school holidays, was a period of around two months.
39. As I have said above, section 19 of the Education Act says councils must make arrangements for the provision of suitable education for children who, by reason of illness, exclusion from school or otherwise, may not for any period receive suitable education unless such arrangements are made for them. The fact that Y was on roll at a school did not absolve the Council of its duty.
40. The Council was not satisfied that Y was receiving suitable education between June and September 2024. It suggested a tuition service to the school and then challenged the school about this a month later when the school had not followed up on it.
41. In these circumstances, that the Council had a duty to make arrangements for the provision of suitable education for Y.
42. I accept that formal tuition is not the only way a child can receive education. I also appreciate that Y was getting work sent home by her school.
43. However, the Council clearly believed Y may have been able to access tuition (as it recommended it to the school). Certainly, once the school eventually referred her for tuition, she did begin to access it.
44. Not referring Y for tuition earlier was a missed opportunity for her to get an education which was more substantial than simply doing work which had been sent home for her. There is no evidence that she would not have been able to access tuition during the period in question.
45. Although it is difficult to assess how much education would have been made available to Y had she been referred for tuition earlier – or how much of it she would have been able to access – I am satisfied, on balance, that she suffered some injustice. The Council should now take action to recognise this.

Back to top

Action

46. Within four weeks, the Council has agreed to make a symbolic payment of £500 to Mrs X. This recognises that, because of its delays arranging tuition, Y missed the opportunity to access more substantial education over a two-month period.
47. The Council will provide us with evidence it has made this payment.

Back to top

Decision

48. The Council was at fault, and this caused Y an injustice, which the Council will now take action to remedy.

Back to top

Investigator's decision on behalf of the Ombudsman