Summary: There was no significant fault in how the Council investigated a complaint under the statutory children’s complaints procedure. We therefore have no grounds to question or reinvestigate its findings, and completed our investigation on this basis.

The complaint

1. I will refer to the complainant as Mr P. Mr P is represented in his complaint by an acquaintance, to whom I will refer as Miss K.
2. Mr P says the Council did not properly support and protect him as a child, when it was aware he was suffering alleged abuse from his mother. He considers this has had long-term implications for him, including that he was unable to pursue his chosen career with the Army.
3. With Miss K’s assistance, Mr P has pursued this complaint through the statutory children’s services complaints procedure. The outcome of this was to partially upheld elements of Mr P’s complaint, but not on any of the significant points Mr P had made. Miss K has now referred the complaint for further consideration by the Ombudsman.

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The Ombudsman’s role and powers

4. We investigate complaints about ‘maladministration’ and ‘service failure’. In this statement, I have used the word ‘fault’ to refer to these. If we are satisfied with an organisation’s actions or proposed actions, we can complete our investigation and issue a decision statement. (Local Government Act 1974, section 30(1B) and 34H(i), as amended)

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How I considered this complaint

5. I reviewed the full range of documents setting out Mr P’s statutory children’s services complaint, including the findings at each stage and the Council’s adjudication letters.
6. I also shared a draft copy of this decision with each party for their comments.

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What I found

Children’s statutory complaints procedure

7. The law sets out a three-stage procedure for councils to follow when looking at complaints about children’s social care services.
8. The first stage of the procedure is local resolution. More complex complaints do not have to be considered at this stage but, where they are, councils have 20 working days to respond.
9. The regulations say that, if a complainant is not happy with a council’s stage 1 response, they can ask that it is considered at stage 2.
10. At stage 2 of the procedure, councils must appoint an investigating officer (IO) to carry out the investigation. The IO should be entirely independent from the council. There will also be an independent person (IP), who is responsible for overseeing the investigation.
11. If a complainant is unhappy with the outcome of the stage 2 investigation, they can ask for a stage 3 review by an independent panel. The panel’s role is to determine whether there were any flaws in the stage 2 investigation.
12. The Ombudsman’s approach to this type of complaint is generally to review how the complaint has been handled at each stage, ensure any identified injustice has been appropriately addressed, and that any recommendations arising from the investigation have been implemented.
13. In most cases we will not reinvestigate the actual, substantive complaints. This is because the complaints will have already been competently investigated by an independent IO, and their findings reviewed by an independent panel. Under such circumstances, there is no real possibility further investigation will produce a significantly different outcome, and we do not consider it proportionate to provide a further level of investigation at public expense.
14. The exception to this is where there is evidence of a fundamental flaw in the procedure. By fundamental flaw, we mean an error which is so serious there may have been a substantially different outcome, had it not occurred. In such circumstances, the Ombudsman may decide to re-investigate part or all of the substantive complaint.
15. But the Ombudsman does not, and cannot, provide complainants with a right of appeal against decisions they disagree with. We do not make our own findings on issues which require expert, professional judgement, and nor do we substitute the findings of council officers with our own. While we may criticise councils where they have made administrative faults, this does not mean we can make operational decisions on their behalf.

Mr P’s complaint

16. Mr P was born approximately 30 years ago and grew up mostly in the Council’s area. As a child, the Council had significant involvement with his family, because of allegations of violence and abuse between Mr P and his mother. This included a period in 2007 where Mr P was in foster care, before returning to his family.
17. The Council’s involvement in Mr P’s life predominantly ended in 2010, when he turned 18, although he had sporadic further contact with the Council after then.
18. These events formed the basis of Mr P’s complaint to the Council, which I will now summarise.

Stage 1

19. Mr P made his stage 1 complaint to the Council in June 2020. He said the Council had failed to protect him from his mother’s abuse as a child, and had placed him with foster carers who also mistreated him. Mr P complained the Council had consistently refused to provide him with help and support, and that he was still suffering the consequences of this.
20. Mr P said he considered the Council should now provide him with Leaving Care services. He also said the Council should pay him £140,000 compensation (a figure he later revised to £155,000). This is because Mr P felt the Council’s alleged failings had left him unable to pursue his chosen career in the Army, and this was the amount of money he calculated he had missed out on as a result.
21. After a further exchange of emails between Mr P and the Council, in which he provided more detail, and complained about his current living conditions, the Council produced a formal response to the complaint on 8 September.
22. The Council said its records showed it had offered to provide Mr P with Leaving Care entitlements, although he was not actually eligible for these as he had not been in care for 13 weeks, which was the qualifying threshold. However, the Council said Mr P had turned down its support at the time, and said he only wanted temporary accommodation as he would soon be joining the Army. The Council provided him with this.
23. The Council commented Mr P’s complaint was historic and so it could not really consider it. However, it had agreed to look into Mr P’s housing situation, which was a key part of his complaint and what he considered the most important aspect. The Council said its housing department would look into Mr P’s housing application once he had provided some necessary documentation, and offered to assist him with doing this if necessary.
24. The Council also explained to Mr P how he could make an historic complaint if he wished.

Stage 2

25. The Council treated Mr P’s reply to its stage 1 response as a stage 2 complaint. It wrote to him on 22 September explaining it was now seeking to appoint an IO and IP, and the statutory timescales for stage 2 (25 working days, with a permissible extension to 65 days in complex cases). The Council also warned Mr P it might not be able to fully investigate his complaint, due to its historic nature and the fact Council staff members may no longer be available.
26. The IO and IP held a virtual meeting with Mr P in October 2020, where they discussed his complaint and desired outcomes, with Mr P agreeing to a statement of complaint and the wording of 11 different complaint headers in November.
27. In December, the IO and IP interviewed two members of staff from the Council’s Leaving Care Service. The IO then completed and issued the stage 2 report in January 2021 (the report actually says ‘January 2020’, but this is clearly a typing error).
28. I will now set out each of the 11 complaint headers, and a summary of the IO’s finding for each:

1. That the Council had failed to ensure Mr P was supported and safeguarded while in care in 2007.

The IO found the evidence did not support this allegation. He said Mr P had chosen to return to his mother’s care in 2007, and had chosen not to accept support from the Council after this, despite it being offered. The IO did not uphold this complaint.

2. That the Council has not assisted Mr P despite knowing his mother had threatened to kill him in 2007.

The IO said this incident was in the Council’s records, but Mr P had subsequently declined to make a complaint about his mother. After a further incident, and with his mother’s agreement, Mr P had gone into foster care in May 2007, but returned to his mother’s care, at his own request, in August.

The IO found the Council had appropriately safeguarded Mr P, and also noted it had supported him further in 2009. The IO did not uphold this complaint.

3. That the Council repeatedly returned Mr P to his mother’s care, despite knowing she presented a risk to him.

The IO noted again that Mr P had returned from foster care to his mother’s care in 2007 at his own request. In 2008, he told the Council his mother had ‘kicked him out’, and he later moved to a different London Borough. Between 2009 and 2010, the Council supported Mr P while he was in B&B accommodation, but he had then declined any further support from the Council despite being told he was entitled to it. The IO said there was nothing further in the Council’s files until 2016, when Mr P had asked for housing support.

The IO said the evidence did not show the Council had returned Mr P to his mother’s care, and that Mr P had returned to her care at his own volition. The IO did not uphold this complaint.

4. That the Council had not considered Mr P’s wishes and feelings while he was in care, or before returning him to his mother.

The IO quoted several examples from the Council’s records where it had sought and considered his wishes and feelings during his period in care, and at his review in 2010, where it had offered him services which he had declined. The IO did not uphold this complaint.

5. That Mr P had had to repeatedly seek from the Council the help he was eligible for when at age 18, and was “threatened with security” if he did not leave.

The IO said there was a note describing Mr P attending the Council office in 2010 (when he was 18), but this did not say staff had threatened to call security if he did not leave, nor that he had behaved in such a way that staff might have felt the need to call security. The IO said he would expect to see some record of such an incident if it had happened, and so did not uphold this complaint.

6. That Mr P was not allowed to have a meeting with a manager from the Council’s Children’s Services or Leaving Care team, and was told to leave the building when he said he was a care leaver and vulnerable person.

The IO confirmed the Council’s records show he attended meetings with members of the Leaving Care team in 2010, but did not say he had requested a meeting with a manager at that time. There was also no record he had requested such a meeting in 2016, or 2020, when he had had further contact with the Council. The IO repeated there was no evidence to support Mr P’s allegation he had been told to leave the Council’s offices. The IO did not uphold this complaint.

7. That Mr P was not provided with Leaving Care entitlements.

The IO said the Council had decided Mr P was entitled to Leaving Care support as a ‘Formerly Relevant Young Person’. The IO said this was actually incorrect, as Mr P had only been in care for 12.5 weeks, short of the 13 weeks qualifying threshold; however, he noted the Council had decided to be flexible.

The IO noted again Mr P had been offered support in 2010, which he had chosen not to accept. He also noted Mr P had been funded to live in B&B accommodation in 2009. The IO did not uphold this complaint.

8. That Mr P had been entitled to Leaving Care support to the age of 25, but did not receive this, which had caused his physical and mental health to deteriorate.

The IO referred to several of the Council’s records in addressing this complaint. He noted again the fact Mr P had declined support in 2010, and that in 2017 he had enquired with the Council whether he could receive support, but the Council had told him he would not qualify at that time. In 2020, the Council had granted Mr P £1000 to secure better accommodation, as a goodwill gesture. He noted the officer involved in this – whom he had interviewed – had gone to considerable lengths to help Mr P at this time, and had considered his mental health and vulnerability as part of the process. The IO said there was no evidence to support Mr P’s claim the Council had failed to help him, and that there was no record he had any physical health problems.

The IO also noted Mr P was incorrect to say he was entitled to support to age of 25, as this had only come into law in 2018 and was not retroactive. The previous law, which applied to Mr P, entitled him to support to age of 21.

The IO did not uphold this complaint.

9. That the Leaving Care team had not assisted with his housing situation, despite agreeing to do so.

The IO reiterated the Council had supported Mr P to secure his current accommodation, despite having no obligation to do so. He did not uphold this complaint.

10. That Mr P had presented him to the Council as homeless, in need of help and support, and that he was a care leaver. Despite completing an application form he had received no reply from the Leaving Care team.

The IO reiterated again the Council had supported Mr P to secure his accommodation in 2020. He did not uphold this complaint.

11. That the Council had not dealt with his complaint within the statutory timescales, and had ‘prevaricated’.

The IO said the Council had taken longer than the statutory 20 working days to deal with his stage 1 complaint, but noted it had needed to seek internal advice because of the historic nature of the complaints. He also noted the Council had agreed to investigate the historic complaints at stage 2. The IO said there was no evidence the Council had prevaricated or been evasive, although he said it would have been better if the Council had explained its decision about the historic complaints at stage 1. For this reason, the IO partially upheld this complaint.

29. In concluding, the IO considered Mr P’s desired outcomes. He considered Mr P’s wish to move to better accommodation had now been addressed, and made no further comment; and did not consider there was evidence to support Mr P’s belief he had been unable to pursue his Army career because of the Council, and therefore did not agree the Council was liable to pay him compensation for his purported loss of earnings.
30. The IP’s report concurred with the IO’s findings and agreed the investigation had been properly conducted.
31. Following this, the Council sent Mr P its adjudication letter in February. It said it also agreed with the findings of the IO, including his conclusions on Mr P’s desired outcomes. The Council offered Mr P £100 to reflect the delay in dealing with his stage 1 complaint, but said it could offer no more than this.

Stage 3

32. Soon after receiving the stage 2 response, Mr P replied to express dissatisfaction with it. He said the IO had missed out some key details about the alleged abuse from his mother, as well as his housing situation, both historic and more recent. The Council accepted this as an escalation to stage 3 and commissioned an independent review panel for this purpose.
33. The panel met virtually in June 2021, with Mr P being represented by Miss K, and issued its report a few days later. The panel explained its purpose was not to reinvestigate Mr P’s complaints, but to review the stage 2 investigation and its findings and recommendations.
34. The panel recommended the stage 2 outcomes for complaints 1, 2 and 3 should be amended to ‘partially upheld’. While it agreed the Council had met its formal duties in addressing the allegations of violence and abuse between Mr P and his mother, it considered there had been lack of “professional impetus and curiosity”, and that more work should have been done to assess their needs and the options open to the Council to protect them. The panel also criticised the Council for failing to complete a Core Assessment of Mr P earlier than July 2007, when his foster placement until it had already begun to break down, although it agreed with the IO there was no evidence the Council had ‘returned’ Mr P to his mother as he had alleged.
35. The panel made a further criticism of the Council, in that social workers dealing with the case at that time had not had access to case records from earlier than 2006, which was because the Council had moved from a paper to an electronic record system at that time.
36. The panel also recommended the outcomes for complaints 5 and 6 should be changed from ‘not upheld’ to ‘no finding’, to reflect that the evidence did not allow clear findings to be made on Mr P’s allegations about his attendance at the Council’s office.
37. However, the panel agreed with the IO’s findings on all other complaints. It also agreed it was not appropriate to recommend the Council comply with Mr P’s desired outcomes, for the same reasons given by the IO. The panel said it was satisfied the Council went beyond its legal duties to assist Mr P with his more recent housing situation, and also by offering him Leaving Care services for which he did not qualify.
38. The panel recommended the Council take more positive and proactive steps to assess and take action to protect the welfare of a child or young person in a situation comparable to that of Mr P’s in 2006/7.
39. In July, the Council wrote its final adjudication letter to Mr P. It accepted all of the stage 3 panel’s findings and recommendations, and added that, since 2010, the Council’s children’s services had undergone much change. It said it would now expect the kind of positive and proactive assessment the panel had recommended, and noted that its Looked After Children service had been graded ‘outstanding’ by OFSTED at its most recent inspection.
40. In closing, the Council explained Mr P could now approach the Ombudsman if he wished to pursue his complaint further; and, on 16 August, Miss K referred Mr P’s complaint to the Ombudsman accordingly.

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Analysis

41. As I explained previously, with complaints of this type, we will only reinvestigate the substantive matters where we consider there is evidence of one or more fundamental flaws in how the statutory complaints procedure was carried out.
42. That the complainant disagrees with the outcome of the procedure does not mean there has been a fundamental flaw. It is the nature of such investigations that complainants will sometimes not receive the response they are seeking. Rather, we would need to see evidence there had been a procedural fault, of such significance that the outcome could not be considered safe.
43. I see no evidence of such a flaw here. The Council escalated Mr P’s complaint at each stage as he requested it. It appointed an independent IO and IP to conduct stage 2, and an independent panel for stage 3, and followed each with an adjudication letter in which it accepted all findings and recommendations. Both the IO / IP and panel had access to the Council’s records and met with or interviewed the available people relevant to the complaint.
44. I note, in particularly, that the stage 3 panel took a different view to the IO and IP on some points, and followed this up with a recommendation for how the Council could improve its service. This demonstrates the panel approached the matter critically and did not simply accept the existing set of findings.
45. The Council offered Mr P a financial remedy to reflect the delay in responding to his stage 1 complaint, and although this was small, it was typical of the amounts the Ombudsman recommends in such circumstances. It also explained it had already implemented the type of service improvement recommended by the stage 3 panel, and why it was confident this had addressed the issue identified by the panel.
46. Taking this together, I do not consider I have any grounds to find the Council’s investigation was fundamentally flawed. Instead, I am satisfied it was robustly undertaken and drew logical findings from the evidence available. Under these circumstances, it is not appropriate for the Ombudsman to reinvestigate the substantive complaints, because there is no reason to believe we would make substantially different findings.
47. This said, I do have two comments to make about the Council’s investigation.
48. First, I consider the stage 1 response to be poor. For a start, it is not clearly labelled as being the formal stage 1 response, to the point where I was not immediately sure that is what it was.
49. The response also addresses (albeit briefly) part of Mr P’s core complaint, including the alleged failure to provide him with Leaving Care services in 2010. However, despite this, it then says the Council cannot accept a complaint on these matters, because they were historic and fall outside “the period of six years” in which Mr P could make a complaint.
50. It is not clear what ‘six year’ period the response is referring to here; elsewhere in the process, the Council explained complaints are supposed to be submitted within 12 months to be eligible for investigation. But either way, and to contradict itself further, the response then goes on to instruct Mr P what he needed to do to make a complaint about historic matters – despite the fact it had just said he could not do this.
51. This is all quite confusing, and I believe this response could, and should, have been much clearer.
52. Second, the IO’s consideration of complaint 5 during the stage 2 investigation does not appear, to me, to address the main point.
53. The exact wording of complaint 5, as recorded in the report, is:

“When I was 18 I had to keep going to back the Council [sic] to ask for help when I was eligible for it. Why was this not given to me? Instead of helping me I was threatened with security if I didn’t leave.”

54. In response, the IO explained that, although there is a record of Mr P attending the Council’s office in 2010, there is nothing to suggest he was “threatened with security”, or that his behaviour would have led to staff calling for a security guard.
55. But, to my reading, the ‘security’ issue is not really the crux of Mr P’s complaint here – rather, the main point is his allegation that he was not given the help he believed he was entitled to. The IO did not address this in his findings on this complaint.
56. However, looking at the Council’s investigation in the round, I am not persuaded either of these is a significant point. Although the stage 1 response should have been better, this was only the first stage in the process, and stages 2 and 3 provided a much clearer explanation of the Council’s position on Mr P’s complaints. I am satisfied nothing of importance was lost by the poor quality of the stage 1 response.
57. And, while the stage 2 IO overlooked the main point of complaint 5, the general theme of most of Mr P’s complaints is that he did not receive support from the Council when it was due, and this was something the IO covered thoroughly in his findings on the other complaints. So, again, nothing of importance seems to have been lost by this omission.
58. I therefore do not find fault for these points, and I would merely ask the Council to note my comments here.

Conclusions

59. There is no evidence of significant fault in how the Council completed this investigation under the statutory children’s complaints procedure. The investigation followed the statutory process in all important aspects, and drew safe, logical conclusions on the evidence available. The Council offered an appropriate remedy for the delay at stage 1 and explained it had, in effect, already complied with the stage 3 panel’s recommendation for service improvement. There is nothing the Ombudsman could add here.
60. My only observations here are that the stage 1 response was of poor quality, and that the stage 2 IO did not address the main point of one of Mr P’s complaints, but I am satisfied that neither of these points is significant in the round.
61. I therefore find no fault here.

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Final decision

62. I have completed my investigation with a finding of no fault.

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Investigator's decision on behalf of the Ombudsman