Summary: We have completed an investigation into a complaint about the Council’s management of a case by its children’s services. We found the Council had communicated poorly at times with the complainant, Mrs E. But we found there was no outstanding injustice caused to her because it had apologised, which was a proportionate response for the distress caused.

The complaint

1. Mrs E complained the Council was slow to complete assessments and failed to communicate effectively after its children’s services became involved in her family’s life between February 2024 and October 2025. She considered at times staff displayed a poor attitude towards her and were unprofessional at times.
2. Mrs E said a result there was delay in her husband, Mr E, having unsupervised contact with their children which negatively impacted on family life. She said the events covered by this complaint caused the family unnecessary stress.

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The Ombudsman’s role and powers

3. We investigate complaints of injustice caused by ‘maladministration’ and ‘service failure’. I have used the word fault to refer to these. We consider whether there was fault in the way an organisation made its decision. If there was no fault in how the organisation made its decision, we cannot question the outcome. (Local Government Act 1974, section 34(3), as amended)
4. We must also consider whether any fault has had an adverse impact on the person making the complaint. I refer to this as ‘injustice’. If there has been fault which has caused significant injustice, or that could cause injustice to others in the future we may suggest a remedy. (Local Government Act 1974, sections 26(1) and 26A(1), as amended)
5. We provide a free service, but must use public money carefully. We may not start or continue an investigation if we decide:

• there is not enough evidence of fault to justify investigating, or
• any fault has not caused injustice to the person who complained, or
• any injustice is not significant enough to justify our involvement, or
• we could not add to any previous investigation by the organisation, or
• further investigation would not lead to a different outcome. (Local Government Act 1974, section 24A(6), as amended, section 34(B))

6. If we are satisfied with an organisation’s actions or proposed actions, we can complete our investigation and issue a decision statement. (Local Government Act 1974, section 30(1B) and 34H(1), as amended)
7. Under our information sharing agreement, we will share this decision with the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted).

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How I considered this complaint

8. I considered evidence provided by Mrs E and the Council as well as relevant law, policy and guidance.
9. I gave Mrs E and the Council opportunity to comment on a draft version of this decision statement. I took account of any comments they made or further evidence they provided, before putting this decision statement in its final format.

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What I found

Key legal and administrative considerations

10. Councils have a duty to investigate if there is reasonable cause to suspect that a child in their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm. ‘Significant harm’ covers the risk of physical, sexual and emotional abuse or neglect. They must decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare. (Children Act 1989, section 47)
11. Section 47 of the Children’s Act allows the Council to enquire with all agencies who work with a child and their family. Once the Council completes this initial assessment it can take various actions. At one extreme it can close a case where it finds no grounds to substantiate concerns and no reason to take any other action. At the opposite extreme, it could act to place a child into its care. In between, it has choices including carrying out a detailed assessment of a child and family’s needs. This might lead it to offer services under Section 17 of the Children’s Act.
12. Section 17 refers to services for ‘children in need’. A ‘child in need’ is one who “is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the opportunity of achieving or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without the provision for him of services by a local authority”. This is because of disability or because their “health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, without the provision […] of such services”.
13. Where the council decides to provide services, it should develop a child in need plan which sets out which organisations and agencies will provide which services to the child and family. The Council must review the plan within three months of it starting and at least every six months after that. The plan should have clear, measurable outcomes (see Government guidance: Working Together to Safeguard Children). 
14. A Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) is an order imposed by a court on individuals convicted or cautioned for sexual offences. It restricts the person who receives the order from engaging in certain behaviours that could lead to further harm. For example, by limiting their accessibility to devices that can access online material or preventing them having contact with certain people.

The key facts

15. In early 2024 the police arrested Mr E on suspicion of child sex offences, carried out online. Mr E lived with Mrs E and their two dependent children, one of primary school age and one pre-school.
16. The police alerted the Council to Mr E’s arrest so it could consider action to safeguard Mr and Mrs E’s children. At the time Mr E was in prison and so the Council had no concerns for the children’s safety. It resolved not to carry out any work at that time. Mrs E said she did not agree with this decision, wanting the Council to proceed with any assessment straight away.
17. A few months later, in July 2024, the Council did carry out a child and family assessment. By now, circumstances had changed. Mr E had pleaded guilty to the offences. He was no longer in prison and staying apart from the family home. The Court gave him a SHPO lasting five years. He was also to receive ongoing supervision by the Probation Service. The SHPO prevented Mr E having unsupervised contact with minors without the consent of the Council.
18. The assessment noted Mrs E wanted Mr E to return to the family home. The Council expressed concern about the children’s safety. So, it agreed with Mr and Mrs E a safety plan that allowed Mr E supervised contact with his children only. It also required him to live at a separate address to the family home.
19. The assessment said before Mr E could have unsupervised contact the Council would need assurance he did not pose a risk of harm to his children. This would require him completing further work with the Probation Service. It also said it found it “worrying” the extent to which Mrs E had stood by Mr E and it had concerns she did not understand the risk he might pose. So, it wanted more assurance she could safeguard their children. It noted that Mrs E had previously showed a willingness to attend a course run by the Council to raise awareness with the partners of convicted sex offenders on child safeguarding concerns.
20. The assessment found Mr and Mrs E’s children were children in need. They then became the subjects to a child in need plan. The assessment said this would involve the Council seeing the children every four weeks and it would review the plan monthly.
21. The child in need plan contained the following parts:

• the family would maintain the safety plan until a risk assessment identified that Mr E could have unsupervised contact with his children. A version of the plan dated October 2024 said the Council would complete the risk assessment by December 2024;
• that meanwhile Mr E would continue to engage with the Probation Service;
• that Mrs E would attend the specialist course referred to. The October 2024 version of the plan said she would complete this by December 2024;
• that the Council would undertake direct work with Mr and Mrs E’s eldest child on staying safe.

22. In November 2024 Mrs E complained at the Council’s management of the case. She said the Council:

• had failed to share minutes of the October 2024 review of the child in need plan;
• had cancelled the next review due in November 2024;
• had recorded incorrect information in the child and family assessment;
• had delayed completing Mr E’s risk assessment;
• had delayed in letting her take part in the specialist course it wanted her to attend.

23. In its reply, sent in December 2024, the Council recognised failing to share minutes and that it would now do so. It also apologised for cancelling the November 2024 meeting due to its social worker being off work. It said the risk assessment would complete that month but recognised it had previously given an earlier date for its completion.
24. The Council defended the content of the child and family assessment saying any information Mrs E disputed came via the police. And it said Mrs E’s work and child care commitments had made it hard for her to attend the specialist course. But it noted it had now found a way for this to progress. It had agreed to support Mrs E with childcare arrangements so she could attend the course.
25. Next, and before the end of December 2024, the Council completed its risk assessment of Mr E. This said the Probation Service considered Mr E a high risk offender. It said he had co-operated fully with the service so far and complied with all conditions associated with the SHPO. But that it was too early to say if there was a risk of Mr E reoffending. The risk assessment also raised ongoing concern that Mrs E might not understand the risk Mr E posed to his own children. The risk assessment said the safety plan should therefore remain in place.
26. In February 2025 Mrs E escalated her complaint. She said the Council:

• had again failed to provide her with minutes of a child in need review meeting (this time that held in December 2024);
• had failed to arrange further reviews. That when she spoke to a senior officer about this delay, they told her the Council did not consider her children “a priority”;
• had failed, through its social worker, to provide information on how Mr E could have unsupervised contact with his children. She said its risk assessment contained inaccurate information and that his Probation Officer did not have concerns if Mr E returned to live at home. She said a senior officer had implied Mr E may not have unsupervised contact until his SHPO ended. And that social workers wrongly regarded her as uncooperative because she became frustrated with this.

27. The complaint also raised concerns about some of the practice of the children’s social worker. Mrs E said the social worker had not raised with her at the beginning of a meeting something her eldest child had reportedly said to the social worker. She wanted an adult present at future meetings with her eldest child and for the social worker to put information in writing to her. When speaking to me Mrs E also raised concerns the social worker did not visit the home to see the children more often. And that they gave Mr E specific information about when Mrs E would attend the course, which she thought unprofessional.
28. In its reply, the Council:

• recognised the delay in sending minutes from the December 2024 meeting, for which it apologised;
• noted Mrs E could not attend a child in need meeting it had tried to arrange in January 2025, leading to its cancellation;
• apologised for any impression it gave that Mr and Mrs E’s children were not a priority. It said the context for Mrs E’s conversation with its senior officer was that the children’s social worker had gone on a long-term absence from work. The senior officer had been in the process of reassigning the social worker’s cases;
• said the Probation Service did not disagree with the content of Mr E’s risk assessment completed December 2024. It sought to offer reassurance that it would undertake another risk assessment. This would follow when Mr E had completed more work with the Probation Service and Mrs E had completed the specialist course. It wanted to move to a “less restrictive” arrangement for Mr E to spend time with his children, as soon as it considered it was safe for it to do so;
• said it understood why Mrs E became frustrated at times and offered she could meet with officers to try and achieve better communication between them. It would also consider correcting any factual inaccuracies in its records;
• recognised its social worker could have raised earlier in her meeting with Mrs E, the comments made to her by Mr and Mrs E’s eldest child. The meeting it proposed could also clarify how future meetings between the social worker and the child would proceed.

29. Reviews of the Child in Need plan followed at the end of March 2025 and at six weekly intervals in May and June 2025. The Council then arranged further reviews at monthly intervals between July and October 2025. The review in July recorded that Mrs E had completed work with the specialist course and that it should now carry out a second risk assessment.
30. Mrs E told me she moved house in Spring 2025 and she wanted the Council to reassign her case to another social work team in that locality. However, the Council did not do this before Summer 2025. Mrs E told me that following the transfer to the other social work team she considered relations improved between her and the Council.
31. The Council then went on to complete its second risk assessment of Mr E in September 2025. This found Mr E had continued to engage fully with the Probation Service and other support offered to him. While the Probation Service considered he remained a high risk offender, it expected to reduce that designation when he completed some further work. The assessment found Mr E had awareness of his actions and had maintained a commitment to change and not reoffend. It also noted Mrs E had completed the specialist course and could show she knew how to keep her children safe. It further noted that Mr E would remain subject to the SHPO which provided additional safeguards.
32. The assessment therefore concluded that Mrs E could exercise responsibility about when Mr E could have unsupervised contact with their children. The Council therefore agreed at a child in need review meeting held in September to discontinue the safety plan.
33. In October 2025, a final child in need review meeting took place. This noted all actions on the plan had completed and so there was no need for the Council to remain involved with the family, as it no longer considered the children as children in need.

Findings

34. In considering the Council’s involvement with Mr and Mrs E’s family, I began by considering Mrs E’s complaint that it did not complete a child and family assessment sooner. I could understand why she had some frustration here. Mrs E understood why Mr E’s arrest led to the Council contacting her. She also understood the need for the Council to complete an assessment given she wanted Mr E to remain in his children’s life. She wanted that to proceed quickly believing this was in the interest of all the family.
35. However, I considered there were good reasons for the Council to delay its assessment. When the Council first learnt of Mr E’s arrest, he had not been sentenced and was in custody. I noted the charges he faced carried potential for a prison sentence. He also faced the prospect of an SHPO which could potentially include restrictions on his living arrangements.
36. I considered these factors meant that had the Council carried out an assessment before Summer 2024, it risked being out of date by the time of Mr E’s sentencing. Realistically, I did not consider the Council could complete an assessment before then.
37. But also, even if I had found fault with the delay in the Council carrying out its child and family assessment, I considered no injustice would result. Because I cannot see the outcome of any assessment would have been significantly different.
38. This was because the assessment had to take account of the nature of Mr E’s conviction and its overriding duty to keep Mr and Mrs E’s children safe. The Council could not approve unsupervised contact between Mr E and his children until assured it was safe to do so. Until it had that assurance it would require an agreement such as the safety plan.
39. I considered next what happened once the Council completed the child and family assessment and began treating Mr and Mrs E’s children as children in need. Mrs E considered some of the steps in the child in need plan could have completed sooner and I found evidence of some delay in these completing.
40. First, the Council’s reply to Mrs E’s complaint suggested its initial risk assessment took longer to arrange than it foresaw. So, that was a potential fault.
41. However, I did not investigate this delay as I could not see an earlier risk assessment would have produced a different outcome. So, any delay would not have caused an injustice.
42. I reached this finding after noting the risk assessment clearly explained the social worker’s view that despite doing everything expected of him since his conviction, Mr E remained a high risk offender in the view of the Probation Service. They thought it was too early to consider supporting unsupervised contact until he had worked more to reduce the risk of his reoffending. This risk assessment also took account that Mrs E had not yet completed the specialist course, to provide it with reassurance she could keep the children safe.
43. I had no reason to think the social worker would have had any different views, had they completed their risk assessment up to three months earlier.
44. Second, I noted there was delay before Mrs E could take part in the specialist course the child in need plan said she would attend. The initial versions of the plan foresaw her doing so by December 2024. But she did not begin it until 2025. I noted the Council put steps in place to help Mrs E attend but accepted it may have taken those steps sooner.
45. I decided not to investigate this matter further. This was because I could not find the delay resulted in any injustice to Mrs E.
46. While I was sure Mrs E became frustrated waiting to begin the course, her attendance on that was not decisive to the Council’s risk assessment completed December 2024. I could not find the delay therefore influenced how long it took for the Council to agree Mrs E could begin exercising responsibility on when Mr E would have unsupervised contact again. That judgement depended on the Council being satisfied with progress made by Mr E towards not reoffending.
47. I understood that after the first risk assessment completed why Mrs E must have felt uncertain about what needed to happen if Mr E was to return to live with the family or have unsupervised contact. The first risk assessment clearly set out why the Council considered it was too early to support this. But it did not set out clear, measurable goals for what needed to happen for it to reconsider its judgement. Nor did the child in need plan change to set such goals.
48. This uncertainty also coincided with a period beginning November 2023, when the Council’s communications with Mr and Mrs E clearly fell short on occasion. Twice, Mrs E had to chase the Council to send minutes of child in need reviews. The Council also did not schedule the reviews as often as it said it would. And Mrs E gained the impression from a lack of visits from the social worker, and her conversation with a senior officer, that the Council did not consider the family’s case a priority. Allied to this, she also gained the impression that it could be years before social workers would support Mr E having unsupervised contact. There was clearly some fault here by the Council.
49. I considered the injustice this caused Mrs E was that of distress, as it further contributed to her uncertainty. However, I found the Council made subsequent efforts to limit that. Its replies to her complaint, especially the second reply, sought to correct the impression Mrs E had gained. It was empathetic in tone and offered action to try and reset relations between Mrs E and the Council and I considered it succeeded in that. It set out the Council did not see its role as standing in the way of unsupervised contact at all costs. So, by July 2025, the Council considered the time had come where it could reconsider its risk assessment of Mr E and it recorded that. Within weeks the Council was content to end the safety plan and for Mrs E to exercise her judgement on whether Mr E could have unsupervised contact again with the children.
50. In addition, I considered Mrs E’s injustice mitigated for two reasons.
51. First, while the Council did not clearly set out actions Mr E needed to complete before it would reconsider its risk assessment, other actions in the plan were clear. For example, that Mrs E would complete the specialist course as part of the plan.
52. When I spoke to Mrs E she questioned some of the approach towards her on that course. But I did not investigate the detail of that. This was because I thought it reasonable the Council have a scheme in place to help those with children whose partners have committed sexual crimes. I considered the content and structure of the course a matter of judgement for those who designed it, who would have specialist knowledge of the subject material. Mrs E could question the effectiveness or usefulness of the course for her, but that would need lead me to find fault with it.
53. I also understood from Mrs E’s perspective why taking part on the course did not feel voluntary. This was because she knew the Council would object to Mr E having unsupervised contact with his children without her completing it. However, I did not find that made its request she complete the scheme coercive. The Council would need assurance Mrs E could keep her children safe given the circumstances of Mr E’s conviction. I considered expecting Mrs E to complete the course was a proportionate means of achieving that aim, which had the needs and welfare of Mr and Mrs E’s children at its core.
54. The second factor mitigating Mrs E’s injustice from the Council’s poor communications, was the presence of a factor outside its control which would influence its judgement on Mr E having unsupervised contact. This was that the Council relied on Mr E working with an external agency, the Probation Service. While the Council needed to exercise its own judgement on any potential risk posed by Mr E to his children, it would understandably place weight on the Probation Service’s judgement. The Council could never say to Mr and Mrs E with any certainty when the Probation Service’s judgement might change which would inevitably influence its own.
55. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 49 to 54 I did not consider the Council needed to do more than apologise to Mrs E for its fault, which it had done. I therefore used my discretion to complete investigation into the Council’s poor communications with her, finding there was no unremedied injustice to her.
56. Next, I noted also that Mrs E’s complaint raised some potential disagreement with judgements reached by social workers in the child and family assessment and first risk assessment. However, I had no reason to say they did not reach their judgements properly. In both assessments, the social workers who prepared the documents gave clear reasons for their thinking. I could only find fault with their judgement if I considered those reasons relied on something irrelevant or failed to take account of something relevant. Or else they reached their judgements based on an incorrect understanding of the facts. I had no reason to say any of those circumstances applied here.
57. Finally, I noted Mrs E’s comments on the professionalism of the social worker she worked with when her children were first subject to the child in need plan. While I recognised her concerns I did not find her comments reached the threshold where we would make a separate finding of fault causing injustice to her or her family.
58. In summary therefore I found there were some deficiencies in the Council’s management of this case at times. But nothing that led me to think that these had any significant impact on the overall direction of events. It was always likely to take many months to allay the Council’s concerns about Mr E’s potential to harm his children. That arose fundamentally from the nature of his offending and the need for the Council to put the safeguarding of his children first in its dealings with Mrs E.

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Decision

59. For the reasons set out above I therefore completed my investigation into this complaint. While I considered the complaint showed evidence of fault by the Council, I considered this had either not caused injustice, or the Council had remedied the injustice.

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Investigator's decision on behalf of the Ombudsman